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i
AaSTRACT
The Saturn launch vehicle's gu i dance and control system is so complex that the
reliability of a simplex system is not adequate to fulfill mission requirements.	 Thus, to
achieve the desired reliability, redundancy encoiiipassing a wide range of types and levels
was employed. At one extreme, the lowest level, basis, components ( resistors, capacitors,
relays, etc. ) are employed in series, parallel, or quadruplex arrangements to insure con-
! tinued system operation in the presence of possible failure conditions.	 At the other extreme,
the highest level,	 complete subsystem duplication is provided so that a backup subsystem
can be employed in case the pi •ima><y System malfunctions.	 In between these two extremes,
many other redwidancy schemes and techniques are employed at various levels. 	 Basic
redundancy concepts are covered to gain insight into the advantages obtained with various
techniques.	 Points and methods of application of these techniques are included. 	 The
theoretical gain in reliability resulting from redundancy is assessed and compared to a
simplex system.	 Problems and limitations encountered in the practical application of
redundancy are discussed as well as techniques verifN ,ing proper operation of the redundant
channels.	 As background for the redundancy application discussion, 	 a basic description of
I the guidance and control system is included.
"'Mr. Moore is now Director, Electronics and Control laboratory, MSFC,
*`-Dr. White is now associated with the Data Systems Laboratory, AISFC.
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APPLICATION OF REDUNDANCY IN THE SATURN V
GUIDANCF: AND CONTROL SYSTEM
F. R. Moore :end d. 13. White
Guidance and Control Division, Ast • ionics Laboratory
NASA, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama
Abstract
The Saturn lac nch vehicle's guidance and control
system is so complex that the reliability of a simplex
system is not adequate to fulfill mission requircment.,.
!'hus, to achieve the desirc • 1 reliability, redumeurcy
encompassing a wide range of types and levels was em-
ployed. At one extreme, the lowest level, hasic com-
ponents (resistors, capacitors, relays, (-tc. ) :r re em-
ployed in series, parallel, or quadruplex arrangemerts
to insure continued system operation in the presenev of
possible failure conditions. At the other extreme, the
highest level, complete subs •:stcnt duplication is pro-
vided so that a backup subsy,tcnt can be employed in
case the primary system malfunctions. In hctwcen these
two extremes, many other redundancy schemes and tech-
niques are employed at various levels. Basic redundancy
concepts are covered to gain insight into the advantages
obtained with various techniques. Points and nethods
of application of these techniques are included. The
theoretical gain in reliability resulting from redund:nvv
is assessed and compared to -I 	 system. Prob-
lems and limitations encountered in the practical appli-
cation of redundancy are discussed as well as technigpes
verify ing proper operation of the redundant channels.
As background for the redundancy application discussion,
,I
	
description of the guidance and control s y stent is
included.
It, , It
Nomenclature
A	 ratio of failures detected by current sensing 	 it :1 , It ! , Ire , It I
to all failures inn duplex memory
F	 number of units that have fail( (I in a simplex
	 It ,et , It! 1 it c 1system after tine t
it-	 I{h0• Re
It ( , it 
It 11, It 
N.	 number of components of type i
r
N	 number of components or el--rnents com-
	I{ It.0	
^	 Iprising :e simplex system
n	 mun')er of modules in a simplex computer 	 It	 It
m 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF 1'OUIt QUALrfy
P, P	 prohahility of success and failure,
respectively, of a redundant arrange-
ment or system
P	 actual but unknown system reliability
a
P	 estimated reliability obtained through
c
sampling
P	 reliability gained by considering fail-
E,	 ores in opposite directions cancelling
in a I'Mit digital arrangement
Plr , P lea	 probability that the h and h' converter,
respectively, in :I 	 power supply
is good
I' ll low , I' ll' low probability that the h and h' converter,
respectively, in a duplex power supply
fails low
I'1 , P.. ---pn
It. 1{
k	 environmental adjustment factor
rn	 total number of tr ials in simulated sampling
N	 numher of remaining good elenenls fu a
simplex system after time t
N ,
	 number of duplex memory pairs in series
.W.• a
prohahility that the events, ft , ^, ,---
t ,, , respectively, will occur
probability of success (or reliability)
and failure, respectivel y , of :I
unit
relialidit y of mcnrrn• v modules I and
respcctivcly, of a duplex pair
probability of success of a simplex
unit denoted by the subscript
probability that the a, lo, or c •
 unit,
rospect yely, fails to a logical "1"
probability that the a, h, or a unit,
respectively, fails to a logical "0"
reliability of a power supply (or cxc • ita-
tion source) and a simplex feedback
amplifier, respectively
reliahility of a simplex c • omrrter and
the ac• celcrometcr encoder :nd sit-nal
conditioning circuitry, respectively
reliahility of the logic and :en ac • tuator-
ser:oamplifier c• hnnncl, respectively
multiplexer and oscillator reliahility,
respectively
^
I	 ^
^	 I
R	 R	 reliability of the subtract and limit
q	 s
check circuitry and a switch, respec-
tively
R 
	
reliability of platform sliprings,
gimbal angle resolver. and tlw
crossover detectors
R , R	 reliability of a decision clem e nt (or
v w
voter) and a hydraulic suppf.N.
respectively
R	 R	 reliability of an attitude rate commandI,	
channel and an attitude command
channel, respectively
possible states of as clement
T, t
	
total mission time and operating time,
respectively
t ik	 thae at which the k th failure of ith
type component occurs
U	 unreliability or probability of system
failure, expressed in terms of failures
ner million
U	 unreliability of a redundant arrange-
r
	 nit-tit, expressed in failures per
milli,)n
U
rat	
unreliability of the redundant platform
system through the orbital injection
phase, expressed in failures per
million
U Ib	 unreliability of the redundant platfo.-nn
system during earth orbit and lunar
injection phase, expressed in failures
per million
Urab	 unreliability of the redundant platform
system during all flight phases, ex-
pressed in failures per million
U	 unreliability of :he redundant portion
rp of an arrangement containing both
redundancy and simplex units, ex-
pressed in terms of failures per
millionio
U
s	
unreliability elf a simplex subsystem
or system, expressed fit 	 per
million
U 
s p	
unreliability of the simplex portion of
an arrangement containing both
redundancy and simplex units, ex-
pressed in terms of failure- ;x r
millior
Va' V 	 decision element state denoted by tht
subscript
7.	 confidence limit expressed in terms of
c	 standard deviations
1t. Jt i
	unit failure rate and failure rate of the
thi component, respectively
independent events with probabilities
lit, p2' - - -1'11, rcspcc•fively
Inh•odi.ction
The development of the Saturn V launch vehicle
system may fit , traced through succ •essivc dev'•Iopnicnts
of the Saturn I and Saturn III vehicles. which consist of
two propelled stages and an Instrument unit. The first
stage (S-I) of Saturn I e insisted of eight engines lwclh a
combined thrust of 6. 7 	 too N ( 1. 5 million lb) ; the
second stage (S -IV) has six 1.11 2 ; LOX engines with a
total thrust of to. 4	 10' N 00,000 lb). A b'-ilerpl to of
the Apollo spacecraft was flown with Saturn I. The first
stage tS-I11) of Saturn Ill has the same basic eight
engine configuration as the Saturn 1, but the engines have
been modified to increase performance to a total thrust
of 7. 1 x IO C. N ( 1, c; million 16). 'ncc seernd stag e
(S-1VII) of Satur n fit has one largo I.Il ?. LOX engine with
a thrust of 0, 1) - In o N (201),000 Ih). The Instrument
Unit fit 	 vchicics p rovides guidance and control,
vehicle sequencing, telemetry, and other inslrunionla-
tion.
The Saturn Ili system, whose maids n flight occurred
carp• in 1966, hridgcs the gap between the Saturn I and
Saturn V vehicles. This system consists of concepts and
hardware developed for the Saturn 1 program and lncor-
porat , s new ideas, techniques, and hardware required in
the Saturn V system. It h:es the capability of orbitini; the
Apollo spacecraft.
In the Saturn V system. which is being developed to
place a man on the moon, the second stage (S-IVIO of
the Saturn Ill vehicle moves up to become the third stage.
Likewise, the Instrument knit and t`, payload remain
basically intact and make up the forward portion of the
vehicle. The first stage (SAC) consists of five newly
deN , doped engines; cac• h has a thrust appro dinati-IV
equivalent to that of the total Saturn I first sl:lrc, and
the total thrust is 33. 5 , too N (7. 5 million lh). The
second stage (S-II) is li v ing developed with tine 1.I1,
LOX engines, each with a thrust equivalent to that used
on the s-IVII stage; the toed thrust is •1. 5 	 111 N 11. 0
million lhr. The Instrument Unit of theSAurn Vvehicle
f; 6:lsically equivalent to thatof Saturn l awl Ill with
slight modifications or equipment rearrangement to
acconlnlod tc and Iac• ilitate the Apollo mission. The
Saturn V guidance and control system discussed applies
gcneraliv to the Saturn Ill system as welt.
The priman• mission of the Apollo project is to
place three astronauts in a lunar orbit, to I:md hco of tilt-
astronauts tin ill( , moon's surtac(-, and to safely return
the crew to the earth's surface. The Saturn V launch
vehicle is instrumental in the first phase of this opera-
tion for it is the vehicle system that will inject the
spacecraft and its crew into the lunar tcaicct ,, rv. Since
r• i
n C — -N 5 e3
fso much is at stake in this project, both in terms of the
lives of entire crews as well as the tremendous expense
of such an undertaking, it is imperative that each mis-
sion be successfully completed. Considerable effort has
been expended I. om the outset of the conceptual design
phase to insure that the Saturn V launch vehicle is as
reliable as today's technology permits. In many cases,
the technolokv has been extended considerably to meet
the stringent reliability requirements for these complex
missions. In addition to the Apollo mission, it is ex-
pected that the Saturn V vehicle system will bu required
for other critical earth orbit and possibly interplanetary
missions.
Major emphasis has been placed on attaining the
highest reasonable reliability in the development of the
flight-critical guidance and control system of the Saturn
V launch vehicle. The emphasis on reliability has over-
shadowed other design considerations such as minimized
weight, power consumption, and, to sonic extent, cost.
Historically, reliabilit y improvement has been
attacked through simplicity in concept, conservative
design, high reliability component parts, and extensive
testing programs and techniques. These basic princi-
ples have been extensively employed in the guidance and
control system desio. The number and type of func-
tional units required to fulfill the prescribed mission
have been kept to the absolute minimum. The hardware
in the Saturn system is conservatively designed with
flight- p roven components and techniques being employed
to the maximum extent. In spite of the conservatism
and emphasis on simpl,-ity employed in the basic system
layout and detailed hardware design, the implemented
system is still extremely complex, consisting of millions
of component parts which must operate over extended
periods of time. Therefore, redundancy is required to
achieve the desired reliability.
Basic redundancy Concepts
Within the past two decades, tremendous strides
have been made in improving component part reliability.
"'he transistor demonstrated a marked reliability
improvement in comparison to the electronic tube; and,
in more recent years, microminiaturization and inte-
grated circuits have contrihAAA sifnificantly to elec-
tronic circuit reliability improvement. However, even
with this advancement in basic technology, overall
system reliability h:,- not improved sufficiently to meet
today's demand for the following reasons. First, the
number of component parts in today's systems has
increased significantly compared to those of a few years
ago. Second, reliability requirements have increased
considerably because of man-rated systems and the
necessity of extended pertoas of oper:.tion. For these
reasons, new techniques utilizing redundancy concepts
have been developed. The concepts themselves are not
new and were investigatA d by J. von Neumann and others,
however, only recently have th.y been employed on such
a large scale. The Saturn V guidance and control system
represents the largest scale application of redundancy
that exists in any present flight system.
The types of redundancy employed fall into the follow-
ing categories: duplex, triple modular redundant (T%111),
prime-reference-standby (PPS), quadr • uplex, and multiple
parallel elements OIPE:). Each approach is discussed to
point out the reliabilil} improvement obtained.
Three axioms of probability theory useful in the
following deriv: , tions of reliability are as loll,ik^s.
1. If p denotes the probabilit y that an event will
occur, then 1-1) denotes the probability that the event
«ill not occur.
2. if the events 4 1 , t 2 , --- t 
n 
are lndepe • ride tit
events with probabilities p l , IM, --- p
n
, respectively,
then the probability that all of the events shoo'-1 happen
simultaneously when all are in question is the product of
the probabilities
n
p=^ ;r	 (1)i
i	 1
3. If the probabilities of mutually exclusive events
^2, --- # n are Il l , p2 , --- p er , respectively, then the
probability that any one of these events should happen
when all arc in ciucstion is the sum of the probabilities
n
1,	
v 
pi
i	 1
The reliability or probability of success of a single
unit, whether a single component or a system, will ix•
represented by It, and the reliability of the redundant
arrangement try I'. It is assumed that the equipment
under discussion has been operated through a burn - in
phase and does not have or has not reached the wearout
phase. The reliability can therefore be conveniently
expressed as a time dependent function. The expression
relating reliability to time may be simply derived as
follows.
Consider that N integral units, either single0
components or subscr , tems, comprise a system.
Assume that each unit is functioning independently of the
others and that the number of units which have failed at
time t is F. Then, the number of good units ( N) re-
maining after time (t) is
N = N - F	 (3)0
Assuming that flu• I.dlurc rate of the units is directly
proportional to the number of good units results in
!H'	 J1N
(it
	 (•lr
where 1 is the constant of proportionality and is com-
mon ► v referred to is unit failure rate.
(2)
OKiU,:^r3L t	 ,: 'S
OF P( )Oft Q1Jr1L.Ci'Yi
Substituting equation 3 into equation 4 results in
dF = A (N - F) .
	 (5)dt	 o
Solving this differential equation for F and evaluating
the solution at It = 0 and F 0 for the constant of
integration yields
F _ N (1 -
 e- At.
	 (610
If a unit is selected from the set, the probability '.hat it
has failed Is, by definition, F N0 ; from axion, 1 the
probability that it is good is 1 - F; N 0 or from equation 4
is given by
	
R -
 e- At	 (7)
The simplest and lowest level of redundancy utilized
is that which duplicates a component part to prevent
system failure in the presence of a short or open of the
component. With a component that t. ,nds to fail in th^
shorted mode, an additional component would Lx• added
in series; likewise, for a predominant open failure
mode, a parallel component would he added. These
arrangements are shown symbolically in Figure 1; the
truth table represents the possible states of the units.
The total number of combinations of states is derived
from S°, where S is the number of possible states and
n is the number of units. In this arrangement, there
are two states since each unit can either he good or bad,
and the number of units is two, giving four possible
combinations. If in the truth table a "0'' is interpreted
as a failure in the predominant mode and a "1" re-
presents an operative unit, the same table applies to
both the series and parallel combinations.
Truth Cables, which are of primary importat.ce in
the design of logical systems, are useful in enumerating
the possible combinations or states of a system and
selecting the combinations which re;ult in a system
failure as well as indicating the assumptions and failure-
modes in each case. With a truth table and axioms 1,
2, and 3, the Boolean expression for system reliability
can be readily derived. This technique will be used
throughout to derive the reliability expressions.
R
TRUTH TABLE
FOR SERIES OR
a —1
OUTPUT
PARALLEL COMPONENTS
SYSTEM
R 	 Rb	 STATUS
--
R b 0 O FAILED
0 1 OPERATIVE
GUTPUTRb
1
I
0
I
OPERATIVE
OPERATIV,- J
(a)	 (b)
Figure 1. Series and Parallel Configuration
with Truth Table
The probability that the system is operative is given by
P=It a R b -Ra It b +Ra R b .	 (8)
Assuming It = Ra It we obtain
	
P-(1-R)R+R (1-R)+It'
	
2R-It'.
	 (9)
The reliability of the system as a function of time and
unit failure rate is obtained Ir; so5stitcditig equation
into equation 9 which results in
	
P _- e-at ('^-e -At) .
	 ( !O)
The duplex arrangement can also be employed at the
module and sub.,wst;-n leve l , vher^ a single Lrcdemtnant
failure	 Ile cannot I-,- v., ir; ,mcd I ) cNi.A. in th t• t a--
rangement a dccisiori ( ;; - ICU'. t-) dr , ) , I.'1 chnn-
nel is op; rating correctly mu.-t he ;o ,, ,1 r rt.w-r a
dupl^x arrangement, enraoo:;v i cf id. ct+ a! wift;, ^.d a
dect:;ion element with the aF+litir to (:et(­ rr-r^ v-hich of
the two units is gor;d is vasn of a unit fn i 'u.c. 71.1.-, ?a
shown t• nl At' ally ':1 ?'i;;"•- . 2; the t ,'V: 1 1.'e. rcpr n-
sent:; tho	 (f ih:> unit.
TRUTH
Rc,
oIo
Rb)
TAnLE FOR
j nEr 1 SION
LEMFNT
S1Ari,
0
n : IPLE" UNITS
---
S."CTE0.1
SIA) US
'AILED
olo A IFPU Fr)
--	
RQ I ID I n •orcnATtVE
OUTPUT 0 1 j	 A !'AtLEn
E
DE^^;510N
ENT1 01 n FAit- rn
b n OPERf.TIVE
1 i R IPERATIVE
I A OPF.tAT1VE
(o) (h1
Figure 2. Duplex Configuration
with Truth Table
In the• truth Vible, a "0" is interpreted as a failed
unit and a "1" represents an operative unit. The A or B
Ir, the decision element state CO!C!nn indicates which
element has been selected. It has h ca assumed that
the decision element must select one element, but that
both cannot be selected simult :neoesly. Vie logical
conditions necessar} • for the system to be operative are
R I It b• Vb+R a . R b . V :, - it • Rh. VbJ R a' Rb. 
V:1 
where V 
and V i Indicate t,nich unit has been se i cLted. The
reliability  of the duplex s ystem, when the reliability of
the decision element is considered, is given by
P R` + 2 (T:-R') R
	 (11)
v
%%here It  is the dP;:tston element reliability. This
equation redsces to that for the series or parallel cases
(equatior. 10) if the reliability cf the decision element is
ignored; I. e. , it has a reliability of one.
C	 r 3
^l')	 oel .?
The duplex technique is one of the most desirable
forms of redundancy, both in tr rms of simplicity and
reliability improvement. However, the major dis-
advantage which limits its application cons iderahly is
the problem of determining the functional unit µhen it
failure has occurred. The techniques used fit 	 Saturn
system to overcome this shortcoming are discussed
later.
A triplex, or triple modular redundant (TAIRI,
arrangement is shown in Figure 3. lit 	 system the
decision element, sometimes called voter, reacts to the
majority inputs; consequently, only one failure can be
tolerated.
TRUTH TABLE
FOR TMR UNITS
Rp	 DECISION OUTPUTIELEMENT
(u)
(b)
Figtire 3. TDIR Configui%ition with
Truth Table
Four of the combinations result in system failure while
the other four yield proper operation. The ltooic:In
expression for proper operation is
P _ R
a
 Itb 
Rc+Ic a 
RbRc+Ra Rb It fit+I s Iti Ft c (12)
indicating that only one failure can be tolerated. There-
fore, assuming Identical units, the reliability of the
system is given by
P	 :3 ( 1-R) R Z + I13 = 3It2 - 2R3 .	 ( 13)
The reliability of the decistoii element in a TAIR
arrangement may be considered lit
	
of two ways. If
three decision elements are used per trio, i.e. , one
for each element, the reliability of the voter may be
lumped with that of the unit. The reliability of the unit
then is decreased accordingly. If a single decision
element is used for a trio, the result is a trio III
with. a single elem e nt resulting in a reliability given h.
P = (31t2 - 213) 11 % ,	 (!•t)
where R
v 
is the voter reliability. In either case, when
the voter Is assumed to be perfect, R
,,
	
1, the relia-
bility of the system is given by equation 13.
Where Thtit techniques are utilized in digital
applications, advantage can be taken of the possihility of
failures fit 	 directions cancelling. Forexample,
the second combination in the trULh Whir ( Fig. 3) would
not have resulted in it syst m failure if It
a 
had failed to
it logical "0" and It l to a logic al "1," or if Ica had failed
to a logical "1" and It  to a logical "0. " This may be
expressed lit 	 form
Rao Ithi Rc +R
at Rbo Rc
where the second subscript indicates failure mode.
Since this can occur in three such combinations, the
Boolean expression for the reliability gained by opposite
failures cancOling is
Pg	1{'i0 ithl He i It a1 • It bO It c +Rao
• it Rcl +
It 	 It l R 0 + R c It bo • li e   + R`1• itbl• it 
co•
	 (15)
The probability of unit failure is the sum of the prohahil-
ities of component failures to 'I U" slat• and to a
state: thus R R c R t . Without investigating the de-0
calls of :I specific application there is no reason to
suspect :i failure to any particular state V) bu more
prevalent than to the other state consequently,
H	 1/2 It and R i
 1/2 R. This !cads t) the cot,clu-
o	 _	 _
sion that It	 1,'d ( 1-I0 and li t
 - 1/2 ( 1-111. Sub-0
stituting these values into equation 15 yields the relia-
hiiity gained from consideration of failures in oppuslte
directions and is given by
Pg =6 (111) 1/2(1-R) 1/2(f-R))
alt	
1-2R+ It' 11.	 (f6)
The reliability of a TNIII system when failures in
opposite dircctions are considered is given by the sum of
equations 1 :3 and Iii yielding
1'	 (:Iit , - 'a it ,
 )+ 1 3Ft - 311 + 3/2 W)
= 1/2  CM - It')  . 	 (17)
Another redundancy scheme is the primary-refer-
ence-standby ( NIS) t v c • hniquc employing three channels
Iiult sere. :Is the nnmc inil lies, three separate
functions. lit the normal untailed condition, the primary
channel It Is functional lit
	 system. Its output is
comI)ar(A to the reference A; and, lit
	 of disagree-
ment lx-yond an established Ievcl. the standby channel C
is substituted for I3. This scheme along with its truth
table is shown in Figure •1.
Ro RO
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RC SYSTEM STATUS
0 0 FAILED
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0 1 1 I	 OPERATIVE
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TRUTH TABLE FOR OUADRUPLEX UNITS
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rigure 4. PRS Configuration with
Truth Table
Again it has been assumed that the comparator has
selected either B or C, but that it cannot select both
simultaneously. The necessary logical conditions for
this system W be operative are
It E • It ' it C • Vc +R a • 11 * Ile• Vb+ita. it 
Rc. 
Vb
+R It • R •V «R •R • R • V +R •R • It •V
a b c c a b c c a b e b
+R
a R b• it c, 
Vb , 11a .
 
it b* Rc V 
W here V  and VL indicate which element has been
selected. When the units are assumed to b;: identical,
the reliability of the system is given by
	
P (11'- R Z ) (1-211 ) 4	 	 (1H)v
where It is the comparator reliability. If the compar-
v
ator is assumed to have a reliability of one, equation 19
reduces to
P -R(1+R-112).	 (19)
The PI1S technioue has a major disadvant:Ege in that
is is more susceptible to transients or intermittents
than the other schemes. Consequently, if a transient
causes the comparator to switch to the stacdhy unit,
means should be available to switch hack to the original
unit with its reference; otherwise all the advantages of
the redundant system have been lost from that point on.
As discussed later. the switchback technique is employ-
ed in some PRS portions of the Saturn system but not in
others.
The next technique to be. considered is the quadru-
plex arrangement shown with its truth table in Figure 5.
Since the arrangement has four units, 2 4 cot 'nations
are possible. In Figure 5, assume that only one Nilure
in each or in both branches can tx_^ tolerated, and two
failures in any one branch will result in a system
malfunction.
(a)	 (hr
Figure 5. 1luadruplex Configuration
with Truth Tahle
Inspection of the truth table for the quadruplex
arrangement reveals that thr^ system reliability may he
obtained by
P	 1-( 1-11) 4 - 4 (1-Il)^It -- 2( 1-1;) 2 R2
1: 2 (4-4 R+11 2 ).	 (20)
The quadruptex arrangement is most useful when
applied at the component level, I. e. , to resistors,
capacitors, diodes, valves, relays, etc. , v!uvre the
component does not have a single predominant Failure
mode. In applications where a single fai l ure mode
exists, two component:, in series or par:al:l would he
employed in preference to the quaaruplex arrani;cment.
An inherent redundancy exists in some subsystems
Nx cause of cer4cin features of the overall system con-
figucaii,.a dictated by other subsystems. In such cases
the sub>ystem may continue to operate eift r with nn
degradation or with an acceptable degradation of per-
formance in the presence c,f one or more faile,l ele
ments. An example of such a situation c^.L tc in the
Saturn guidance and control :;ystem h . au::c of the re-
quired clustering of engim s to provide thence:, ary
vehicle thrust. Since four engines arc: t;imhaled to
matnt:Ein vehicle control. the failure of orc of the four
control channels in each plane does not anise a system
failure. The subsystem can b trcattt d ns one having
four parallel elements, with the fai l ure o: °.ny on:: ele-
ment b: ing permissthle. This arr:uT;;cment is referred
to as multiple parallel elements (r.R'F.). The applicahle
schematic and truth table are shown In Figure G. Five
combination:: in Figure C, re:,ult in coetinr(-d successful
operations. The resulting cxpre:^::ion for proper opera-
tion is
P = R E It b I1 c Rd 
+ R:1 It b Rc Rcl + It ,c it, Pc Rd
+ 11 It Rc Itci - It E it It id .
Again, assuming identical units results In
P	 4(I-R)R'+It'	 4R 3 -311't .	 (21)
— A
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rates. The unreliability of each component, subsystem,
or system is then expressed as a number of failures per
I itt of time, permitting, easier separation or combina-
tion of the associated numbers without resorting to the
mantput ation of numbers involving a series of "nines. "
Since R in the reliability expressions may be re-
placed by 1-it where R is the probability of subsystem
failure, the reliability of a redundant unit may be ex-
pressed in terms of the probability of failure of the
single nonredundant unit. The result for each type of
redundancy is as follows.
Duplex	 P = I - R2
(b)
Figure 6. DiPF: Configuration with
Truth Table
Any of the redundant arrangements may be cascaded
and the tot •t'_ _ystem reliability may be found from axiom
2. t'ur er.ample, a system composed of two duplex sub-
systems similar to those in Figure 2 would have a
reliability given by
P - (211-R 2 ) 2 .	 (22)
Similarly, a system composed of a duplex subsystem and
a ThIR subsystem would have a reliability given by
P = (211-112 ) (3It2 -lR 3 j.	 (23)
To suunmarize, Table 1 shows the reliability ex-
pression for each scheme discussed in order of relia-
bility preference. However, practical limitations
u-ivally determine the choice of schemes.
Table 1. Redundancy Schemes
Scheme
Reliabilitv
Expression Assumptions
Duplex 2I1-112 Proper decision element
can be determined.
TMR 1/2 (311-11 3 ) Failures in opposite
directions can cancel.
PRS R ( 1+R-R2 ) Reference and normally(
used unit do not fail to
the same state simul-
tancously.
Quadruplex R2 (4-4R+R2 ) Ltmito.l generally to
component part
application.
MPE 4113-3R' 4 elements
Simplex R
In applying the theory to the assessment of the
reliability of a complex system, it is sometimes more
convenient to express reliability equations in terms of
unreliability which can be derived from unit failure
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TMR	 P = 1/2 I2-3R2+R3)
PRS	 P _ 1-2R`+R3	 (24)
Quadruplex	 P - 1 - 2R2+R4
Al PF.	 P 1 - 6R2 + ^T 3 - :;FtI
Further, R e -At and R= 1- e -At	 1- (1-At i---)	 At.
for very small At. Since in equations 24, R is also very
small, terms higher than the second orde r may be
ignored. If the higher order term- are ignored, the
approximations for redundant systent unreliability
expressed in terms of component failure rates and
operating time are
Duplex	 P ', (At)2
TNIR	 P	 3/2 (At)'
PRS	 P	 2(At)2	 (25)
Quadruplex P x 2 (At)2
AI PF.
	 T'	 6 (xtl 2
From equations 25, the ordering of the system in
rank of reliability becomes obvious.
Figure 7 is a graphical comparison of the reliability
of the simplex, duplex, TMR, PPS, NIPS, and quadru-
plex schcnhes as a function of unit failure rate and time,
where R = e At has been substituted into the equations
previously derived. In the case of the TkiR arrange-
ment, failures in opposite directions cancelling; were
assumed; for the PRS arrangement, it was assumed that
the reference unit and the unit to which it is normally
compared do not fail simultmeously to a state whim
cannot be detected by the comparator. The figure
further suhstantiates the relative destratility of each
,chcme. The fact that a portion of the reliability curve
of the quadruplex and AIPI•: scheme falls below that of a
simplex system is not significant because this occurs at
• reliability far below that which would he permissible in
• practical application. It is tntere,ting to note that in
the region above 0. 9, the reltahility of the quadruplex
and Pits schemes is practically idertical (equations 24
,	 .1 25).
Figure S furt'Ier demonstrates the merits of redun-
dant systems compared to a simplex system and indi-
cates quantiUitively what can be gained through the
.^'• t
various techniques. For convenience, unreliability in
terms of failures per million is shown for both the
simplex and redv.ndant systems. In the reliahtlity
assessment and comparisons appearing in the following
sections, the quantities are expressed in these terms.
at
Figure 7. Reliability Versus At for Various
Redundancy Schemes
system. The acceleration information is integrated to
obtain vehicle velocity and position information. The
current measured position information is used to con-
tinuously calculate and combine the gravitational effects
with the measured data to obtain space-fixed vehicle
velocity and position.
The guidance function, which is the computation of
the necessary maneuvers to satisfactorily reach the
specified end conditions, is accomplished within the on-
board digiLil computer system. To give the desired
result, the implemented guidance equations must take
into account various mission and vehicle constraints,
one of the most significant of which is that of propellant
consumption optimization. The equations programed in-
to the onboard digital computer system represent a path
adaptive guidance scheme, termed the iterative guidance
mode (IGNI), which fulfills the optimization require-
ments and the guidance requirements for insertion both
into earth orbit anti injection into the lunar trajectory.
The specific results of the guidance computation are as
follows.
1. Instantaneous required thrust direction express-
ed as three Eulcr angles.
2. Required time of engine cutoff to achieve the
specified orbital conditions.
T
m
aJ
wX
... a
Required time of engine ignition to leave earth
IK	 MILLI IPLE^
PARALLEL
ZLEMENT
TRIPLE
PRS AND	 I	 MODULAR
	
OUADRUPLEX	 I
DUPLEX
.I 100 IOOK  
1
01 10 IOK
I	 IK
10	 100	 IK	 IOK	 1OOK
SIMPLEX FAILURE PER MILLION
Figure 8. Redundant Failure per Million Versus
SLmp t -.x Failures per hti:lion for Various
Redundancy Schemes
Guidance and Control System De scription
The Saturn navigation, guidance, and control
system is cumpletely self-contained within We vehicle
and utilizes onboard inertial sensors, computation, and
control to direct the vehicle according to the desired
path and end conditions. A digital command system is
available as a part of the onboard astrionics system,
but is not planned for use in the primary mode.
The navigation function is accomplished through the
use cf acceleration measurements provided by acceler-
ometers mountedonthe space-direction-fixed stabie ele-
ment of the stabilized platform. The resulting informa-
tion is processed within the onboard digital computation
orbit.
4. Required time of second cutoff to satisf; the
lunar trajectory end conditions.
The required angular directions resulting from the
guidance calculations are applied to the vc 1,Icle through
the control system. In addition to responding to the
commands of the guidance system, the control system
must maintain stabilization of the vehicle attitude in the
presence of various vehicle propellant sloshing, struc-
tural bending, and load _,onc,train*.:;. The elements of
the control system required to accom p lish this task can
be divided into three specific functional arras: sensing
of vehicle state information, computation, and vehicle
torquing. In the Satiwn V system, the vehicle state
information required is that of attitude and rate. (On
the Saturn I and IR vehicles, additional information
obtained thr, ugh vehicle fl y „ d latoral accelerometers
was required to obtain structural load relief. ) The
attitude information is obtained from rceuhers mounted
on the stabilized platform ginchals. Tho information on
actual vehicle orient:cti(m hum the result rs is com-
pared in the onboard digitat computer svoLia with the
desired orientation determ i ne.i from the pi;ldance calcu-
lations, resulting in the dc:.ire.i attitude C01-trol com-
mands. The three-axis atLittato rate il,fp rluation re-
quired to accom p lish veh l t le stat ilti-iNon is obtained
from •.ehicic-fixed rate M ros.
The control "corn put:ution" consists of the gain
modification, filtering, mixing input attitude and rate
information, and shaping of this information to provide
vehicle stabilization in the presence of st,uctural bend-
ing, propellant sloshing,, and other dynamic
REDUNDANT
FAILURES PER
MILLION
67-553
cliaracter • isties. Routing of tins control signals to the
proper end element :o develop the desired vehicle
controlling torques is also part of this function.
Two methods are used to develop the control
torques in the Saturn V vehicle. Positioning of the pri-
mary propulsion engines by hydraulic actuators is used
to control pitch and yaw on each of the three sL• iges. In
addition, control about the roll axis is obtained on the
first two niultiengine stages by the proper differential
positionin g; of th, gimbsled engines. Roll control on the
single-engine third stage, and control of this stage ab, _t
all three axes during coasting phases, is accomplished
by an array of fixed direction thrusters. Pulses of
thrui
'
from these low thrust •ievices are commanded by
the control electronics h.; provide corrective control
torques about the appropriate vehicle axes.
The basic elements of the navigation, guidance,
and control system are shown in block diagram form in
Figure 9, which indicates the primary form of redun-
dancy employed in each element. For a more detailed
desertpCon, the system is broken down Into the digital
computer subsystem, the stabilized platiorm subsystem
and the control subsystem. Fich of these subsysivnis
encompasses a number of hardware elements, with
many performing a varic:.; of functions in the overall
system.
The major systems are broken down in some
instances to the "black box" level and in others to a
specific functional level, depending on which breakdown
is more convenient :uid approp ,ate to illustrate , the
application of redundancy. Although no attempt is made
to describe In detail the total application of redundancy,
examples of the different types are cited and described
in each subsystem. Where available, reliability num-
bers are shown for the various modules in the sub-
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Figure 9. Saturn V Guidmice and Control System
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systems as well as for the WWI subsystems. The
theoretical gain in reliability through redundancy is also
shown in each case. Since the reliabilit y assessments
of various elements were conducted by different groups,
the numbers may not be universally compatible.
However, some adjustment of the failure rates has
been effected where obvious d i -,crepanc • ic;. existed be-
tween the numbers set forth in the various references.
In spite of these adjustments, caution .should be exer-
cised In using the reliability numbers presented, even
though the numbers do indicate in gross terms the rela-
tive reliability of the various elements and subsystems.
The prime intent is not to provide an accurate and inten-
sive reliability analysis, but rather G, tllu^,trate the
benefits of the various redundancy techniques employed.
The simplified equations 'p reviously developed are
used where ix)ssihlc. In many instances, the simplifying
assumptions made in the develoi ment of those equations
do not apply; therefore, specifle equations that apply to
the oarticud:Lr• situation must iR• dt,vcloped.
For convenience, 'he module, subsyste-m, and
system assessments are expressed in turn)", of unrelia-
bility. Through this approach, the relative contributions
of the various eiements c:.n le iul:re easily portrayed.
Additionally, \L ich the	 msimplifying 	 made,
the unreliahiltty numbers of the various subelements can
he added directly to ol,tain the told unrelfability.
As lwvviously sho%%n for highlt reliahle systems,
It = At,
Thu-: approximation van he made with :In error Icss
than (At)' ".
in component or system operation in a particular
application, it degradation factor to account for the
effect of the particular environment must be considered.
This is generally c • allod the environmental adjustment
factor, designated by k. Therefore it = kAt. 'rhe
unreliability numbx -rs acv expressed as U = kat , 106
indicating the number of failures per million flights.
Note that the term "failures" as expressed here is In-
tended to desigivity
 component or system malfunctions
or out-of-tolerar^c operation in a million flights. it
does not indicate the nunifer of vehicle or mission
losses in a million flit;hts. To obtain the latter, which
is not covered in this :Inalvsls, the failure modes of the
various elements and the effects of those failures on the
vehicle lehavior would have to le additionally con-
sidered. Table II shows the k-factor; for the various
stages and the phase times used in deriving; the unrelia-
bility numbers.
Table U.	 Phase Times and k-Factor for
Various Stages
ti	 tuck r
I,ocati	 u1 Comp, munt
Flight --- --
_	
Phase le stag' . 1-11 sttgv F-IVB 2 1 Phase m. , Ihrsl
• Barn t.)inl 'n10 ;uU I15 null j
S-11 Burn - °111 ;nn 45 n.	 inl;
FlrstD-IPnBurn - - ;on 4; n -n4r
orh.tal Cu:ut - - 11) t 4.:.
Kecund 5-I%'B Burn - - Inn 4.., u."`:
J'ranslunar Coast - - 10 1 :. n
Digital Computer Sjstem
The digital computer system developed for the
Saturn V vehicle consists of two basic units, a launch
vehicle digital computer ( LVDC) and :t launch vehi-Ae
data adapter ( LVDA). The LVDC is the basic com-
puting element in the vehicle with the capability of per-
forming ariUtmetic • operations such as add. sithtrac•t,
multiply, and divide; it provides the intelligence fill-
making logical choices. The I.VDA is essentially the
LVDC input/output unit anti all gnats i > and from the
I XDC are processed in this unit. In addition, it per-
forms certain simple computational and logical opera-
lions on data. The computer system is instrumental in
all three phases of operation for the Saturn V vehicle:
i. e. , it plays it major role in the automatic checkout of
the vehicle before launch, solves the guidance actuations
provides attitude correction signals and vehicle se-
quences during the boost phase, and assists in vehicle
checkout during the orbital coast phase.
The LVDC is a serial, fixed-point, stored program.
general purpose machine with it basic: clock of 2. 04'+Allli
Four clocks comprise :I 	 time and 14 bits a phase
time. The machine is organized to operate : , round three
phases or cycles. For e • x:unple, data may he F^ad from
memory during one phase or cycle and operated upon
during the next two cycles. Data %cords 2 1 bits in length
(35 magnitude bits, 1 sign, and 2 parity bits) are used
in Computation. The memory, which contains from one
to eight random-access magnetic core modulus each
consisting of 4096 data words, is arrangcd in Sti c h :t
manner Ulat onedataword ortwo inStruc • tions (each
instruction contains it parity bit) may occupy one 2'+-hit
memory word. Speciai algorithms have bcendeveloped
and implementedfor multiplication a nd division: multi-
plication is done four bits ata time anddivision iS done
two bits at a time. The system utilizes micromini tlur'e
circuitry where power and accuracy requirements per-
mit. Where niicrominiaturization cannot be employed,
conventional discrete, components are used.
During flight, the digitrl computer system inputs
are ( 1) platfonn accelerometer outputs, (2) platform
gimhal angles representing vehicle attitude. ( ;1 1 dis-
c • rcte inputs indicating vehicle functions such as Lift-
off. first stage cute)ff. separation, second stage ignition.
second stage cutoff, and engine out, and (•1) command
receiver signals allowing memory alteration and ground
control.
During flight,the digital computer system outputs
are ( 1) steering or attitude correction commands, (2)
discrete outputs commanding vehicle sequencing such as
cutoff and separation, and (3) telemetry data words,
40 hits each. at :I maximum rate of 240 per second for
monitoring trajectory parameters and computer system
operation.
Because of the critical functions performed by this
system, every effort has been mule to make it as relia-
ble as possible. Many forms of redundancy have been
incorporated into the system, tchich utilizes quadruplex
components and circuits, and duldcx. T111t.:rnd PPS tech-
niques as well as overall System backups. The system
represents one of the largest scale applications of re-
dundancy employed to dale. The LVDC and I.VDA form
:I
	
s)'slem containing more than 95, 111111 equivalent
electronic Components. t )f this munber, less than one
half of one percent are employed in such :I 	 that
:I 	 componcut failure would result ill 	 ;:^. ten
failure.
Figure 10 shows a simplified block diagram of the
LVDC and indicates the redundancy techniques employed
in that unit, to ith the corresponding unreliability indi-
cated in each hlock. The fact that the TSilt timing and
logic depicted ill 	 10 is very much , iniplificd is
borne out when the TNIH or^;anizntion of the LVDC is
considered ill 	 detail. I'or example, since the T:Illl
logic of the machine in considered to consist of seven
functional modules. in the idealized case, it wonld be
cxpec• ted that 21 voters would be employed inthenmehine.
However, because of the various feedhach paths and the
fact that each module has several output signals feeding
various other modules, the idealized model cannot be
employed accuratel y . For example, instead of 21 voters
heing enlplovcd in the LVDC timing and logic, approxi-
mately 155 sil,,iials are voted on, giving :I total of 3951
voters. The IA'DA employs 237 voters in its TNIR logic.
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Because of the relative simplicity of the basic
2. 048 MHz. oscillator (it contains only five electronic
components) and the technical problems inherent In
synchronizing multioscllrators, :I 	 oscillator
system is employed in the LVUC. The output of the
basic oscillator is used to form the necessary phasing
and clock signals in the timing generator. Each channel
of the TMR logic contains its own timing generator;
consequently, a failure of the timing generator results
in a failure of that channel. The memory system.
expandable to modules of 4096 woods, 'l, bits is 'ength.
up to eight memory modules, is employed either is a
duplex or simplex manner depending upon the criticality
of the program being run. For instance, prelaunch pro-
grams are simplexed while flight routines are duplexed.
From Figure 10, it is evident that the reliability of the
LVDC may be approximated by
P = (R ) (R.) (It )	 (26)
o	 t	 m
where R  is the reliability of the simplex oscillator, 111
is the reliability of the combined TAIR timing generator
and logic, and It
m 
is the reliability of thr duplex mcm-
ories. The method, determining the reliability for each
of these will now 1-w considered.
The number of component parts in the systen. and
their failure rate, the Saturn V mission time, and
environmental conditions determine the unreliability of
the oscillator which is U - 16.
s
The reliability for the timing generator and logic
cannot be determined so simply for reasons indicated
previously. Any attempt to accurately compute analyti-
cally the reliability of the 'timing genurawr and the com-
plex logic it feeds, without snaking a great number of
simplifying assumptions, would lead to a mathematical
expression containing literally thousands of terms.
Therefore, a method employing the Monte Carlo tech-
nique, which is basically a technique of simulated
sampling, has been devised so that the reliability may be
approximated.
Although the Monte Carlo technique is general and
has been applied in many other fields, it represents a
rather unique application in this particular field. Thus,
a brief description of the basic procedures using this
technique is in order; the evaluation procedures consist
basically of three phases:
1. With simulation techniqu .^ s, generate a set of
failed components
2. Locate the computer subsystems containing the
failed components
3. Trace the simulated failures through the logic to
determine their conhequenc:e.
The first step consists of generating, by a random
process, a set of failed comix>nents. If in exponential
distribution of time to failure is as,-rmed for at
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component, the probability of failure for that component
is
K	 I - C_ At	 (27)
where t is time and A is the failure rate of the compo-
nent. When the design contains N components of type I,
the probability of failure becomes
i{ - I - r-NiAit	 (29)
Solving equation 2 14 for t yields
t. _ - 
► n	
_ILL
	 ( 29)
tk	 N k
i	 r
where I. ik is the time at which the k th failure of compo-
nent type i occurs. In each trial a random numtx , r be-
tween '1 0" and "1" is chosen and sub.,titutcd for li, and
equation 29 is evaluated. The result is the tune, I ik , at
which the first failnrt. of compronent type f occurs. Then
tik is compared to mission tine T: if 
tik	 T, :r failure
is recorded, N. is reduced by ono, and tho process isi
repeated. As each tik is calculated, it is addod to the
stint of the previous t ile 's and the new total is compared
to mission time. The process is cosnptcled when the
summation of the failure limes excee(:; the mission
time, I. e. , _L't ik > T.
Each of the I th compx , nents in tht. system is assigned
-I The system's functional component that fail-
ed at time 
tik is dt.termincd by nurltilliving the r:ordom
nuniher generate, by the loW numlo • r of I components in
flit .
 group; I. c. , the random nandiu r chosen givos Io)th
time of fadlure and component that failed. This process
is repeated for each component type III 	 ,. -stvm.
'rhe second step consists of locating, within the
logic framework of the machine, the component parts
that failed. The third and final step consists ul tracing
thu effects of the failed components, In the sciluence in
which they occur, upon the T111t logic. It in time T. the
total combination of failures did not result in a system
failure, a s tic ccs-.tuI trial resulted. After many trials,
the reliability of the system is then determined from
13 number of successful trials
total number of trials —
The unrcliabilil; of the LVDC timing generator and
logic u:,int; simulated sampling is I
r - 
10. Approxi-
mati • ly 20. 000 "g:unes" worc played to dete-rmine this
value. The confidence interval, which can be associ-
ated with this e:.tiruate as a function of the number of
trials, Is dctcrmined by
	
P - I' t ZI' 11-P !	 (301
a	 e	 c	 c	 c
m
^f
where Pa is the actual but unknown reliability, P e is the
estimated reliability obtained from simulated sampling,
Z is the confidence limit expressed in terms of stono-
c
and deviations, and m is the total number of trials.
From this, there is 410 percent confidence that
0<U <50.
r
It is of interest to apply the simplified analytical
technique derived earlier and to compare these results
w tth those obtained from the Monte Carlo method. From
the number of component parts in.a simple system and
their failure rates and a Saturn V mission, the unrelia-
bility of a simplex computer liming and logic has been
determined by Monte Carlo to be U s = 2500.
A voter for a logic module adds approximately
25 percent to the number of component parts of that
module; therefore, a simplex machine with enough com-
ponent parts necessary for voters for one channel would
have 25 percent more component parts than a simplex
machine and would have a reliability given by
It	 e- 1. 25nXt
where nat	 In ( 1-2500 x 10-5 ). The unreliability of a
simplex channel with voters then is 1T
s 
1120. If a
simplex machine is divided into n modules, each of
which has a reliability of Itl/n , and triplicated, the
reliability of one trio as given by equation 17 is
P- 112 3RI/n-R3,n	 (31)
Now, the reliability of a TbIR machine consisting of n
sets of triplicated modules is given by
11/2 
(
311	 `)1nP = 	 I/n - R3 n)]	 (32)
For the LVDC, since a simplex machine may be con-
sidered to have been divided in seven equivalent parts,
n = 7, and R for each of the elements is 0. 996840 as
previously derived, t_lie unreliability for the entire TNIR
logic is
L1 = 2 .r
Since in the ideal case it was assumed that the
seven logic modules have equal reliabilities and that the
logic was orgai lzed in such a manner to utilize 21voters
(neither of which is true in practice), it is expected that
the ideal case would result In higher reliability than that
obtained through simulated sampling. The more accu-
rate result derived by :Monte Carlo techniques for the
LVDC is U = 10, which is used in the subsequent
assessment.
The reliability of the LVDC toroidal core memory
system may be found directly from component part count
and failure rates using analytical means. Since a major
problem In duplex systems often is failure detection
mechanisms, it is of interest to note the type of failure
detection employed in the LVDC memory system. The
memory has two types of failure detection circuitry:
odd parity checking and h;ilf select current monitoring.
It is felt that parity checking will detect major failures
in the sense amplifiers, cores, inhibit drivers, memory
buffer registers, and variable strobe gate; while half
select current monitoring will indicate major failures in
the voltage and current drivers, decoupling circuitry,
memory timing, and connection circuitry. Errors not
determined by current checking, however, may be
detected by parity checking.
The reliability of the memory system may be found
directly from the relationship
N
P - ( R t + RZ ( 1-11 1 ) 1A + ( 1-A) (0. 5) j} d	 (;tz)
where R t is the reliability of memory module 1 of a
duplex pair, M is the re!I.n btlity of merno- modu!'^ 2 cif
the pair, :1 is rali) e. L.tltires doteetcd by current sens-
ing to a ll failures, ( 1-•'1 i is v tlo of f: "ut cs rot C_-
tcctc d h,- cerrcnt s^enin ; to ^il fa'lnren, a.!1 11  in the
number of duplex pairs operating in series. Fcaal ;.,n 33
Infers that nit 1110 I , 1 is gnc1 o" Oat t. • c•?ory 1 f.-I l
 a but
2 is trod ani that iha f.-lurc I., (11-ic	 .-! t, tie cc:reeut
sensing; cireu i ta o- • . if it is r,, t Ok L cvL d, t! ere is a
50"50 chance that it will !we puked isle v i th part!-j check-
ing.
The reliability of a single memory module found
from part count, generic failure rater, and Fahu r n V
mission operating conditions Is It = 0. 99F'610; -.^ ! from
engineering desitn anal ysis the chances, of a net a (•t et-
at,le failure ( 1-A) is 0.073 From equation 33, th^ un-
reliability of an ei;*ht memory moc!ulc comig ttrntion with
a storage capacity of SG, 000 dunle:.cd worcla is IT  = 22G.
in summary, the unreliahilih, of th: • I ^'M7 for the
Saturn V mis,iun is the sure of the unreli; I Oi! ; cf the
simplex oscillator, th! TP.lit timrrtl; tetd 101;'.•, wli th 1
four duplexed m-mory mcdulvs, I. e. , iT	 V. + 10
+ 226 - 252.
The reliability of the LVDA is not as straightforward
asthe LVDC because many varied functions c:,!-igledwith
the other systems, primarilrthe I X rDCarip l ;a`orm, are
performed in the LVDA. For e,"lmni c, 02 LY - • :1 power
supplies are required for operating th•, LVDC., pro-
evssing vehicle attiti!de and vela: ity ir'r r::io.tion, and
issuing attitude correctinn commas+:;. farts of the
1.VDA TDIR logic arc time shared and are required with
various critical vehicle functions. The LVDA utilizes
Carious types of redundancy techniques: duplex, TM11,
PRS, as well as system bacL• ap. However, on'.y isolated
types such as the 1.VDA poker supplies and the digital-
to-analog converter subsystem are discussed. All of
these functions are flight critical. The reliability of the
logic portion of the I VDA is found similarly to that for
the 1.VPC• Th•; TNTR logic of the I.VDA has an accessed
unreliahility
 of TT -- 10 for the Saturn V mission.
r
Six power supplies in the LVDA, which supply do
power to the LVDC as well as the LVDA, are all duplex-
ed. Fi i,iire 11 shows a typical lower supply. The do to
do power converters are tied together through Isolation
diodes. Should a converter fail low, the other converter
12	 6?- 5 5 J
PF.GULAIED DC VOLTAGE
TO LVDC AND LVDA
R h ( 1- TIf ) 2	- probability that the converter
is good and that both amplifiers
have failed low. (Th;^ output
of the converter is therefore
high. )
C	 3
picks up the load. It is imperative that a converter not
fail high because the diodes isolation between the two
units would be worthless. The feedback amplifiers used
with each converter are dupiexed to minimize the proba-
Olity of this happening. One duplex system is functional
provided the following condition is fulfilled.
P = p
h (low) . ph' + 1"h , "h' (low) + 11 h • p h' , (34)
i. e. , the output of converter h can be low and h' can he
correct, or the output of converter h' can be low and If
can be correct, or both outputs can be correct. Under
the assumption that the chances of a feedback amplifier
failing low are equal to those of it failing high ( this is a
valid and accurate assumption in this case , the ex-
pression far a simplex power supply (one converter and
two feedback amplffiers) failing low is
Now, the probability that the output of a simplex tower
supply is correct is given by the first two terms and is
1 h	 1'h,	
Ithftf2 + -it h it f (I -it f l .	 (36)
Substituting equations 35 and 36 into equation 34 and
simplying yields
1' - III t It t. (2-11 f ) ) 12( 1-I1 h ) i R h 11 1 (2-R ffl.	 (37)
Front
	 failure rates, it has been determined that
R  - 0. 999937 and It 	 0. 999891 yielding U r .r 0 for a
duplex supply. In comparison, the reliatility of a com-
pletely simplex supply, i.e. , one converter and one
feedback amplifier, is It = IthItf which has an unreliabili-
ty of U s, - 132.
Six supplies are used in the LVDA system; four have
( 35)	 an unreliability of U r 	 and thvo .Oitc•h do not h: +%,,•
isolation diodes because of high current requirements
have an unreliability of ti
r	
5. The unreliability of the
complete LVDA duplexed power supply system Is
U z 4(0) + 21:,)	 10,
r
A block diagram of the LVDA digltal- to- an:dog
attitude correction conversion system is shown in Fig-
ure 12. The system accepts the attitude correction
commands from the LVDC and converts them to an ana-
log form which is c'ompalihlc with the control computer.
It therefore plays a vital :trill critical functon in the quid--
ance and control of the vehicle. The reliabilit y scheme
employed is basically a 1 1 1iS s y stcm with a reference
channel being compared with that which is normally
active. Two comparators ar:^ u:,ed in the sti-stem; one is
an accurate fine comparator while the other is a coarse
comparator :trill compares the outputs front 	 sample
and hold devices and the output amplifiers. The block
diagram of Figure 12 can h,• further simplified to the PRS
redundancy system shown fit 	 1:3. It thi:: Is done,
the i-rime, the referencc, and the st:'ndby.ut its consist
es^,cnti:rlly of the nine-bit register, the ladder network,
sample and hold circuits, and two amplifiers. The voter
then consists of the fine and coarse a ,nrparat<)r. A
single failure in the channel select :,witch results in a
loss of redundancy. ( Although fit
	
cases, multiple.
failures can he tolerated, partic • ular'ly in the various sub-
systems within the vchicic, the basic ground rule used
for subsN , stem desifm was toleration of one (allure. ) The
reliabilit y of the system It:rr all three axv l may be
approximated by the cxpry .lion derived curlier for this
t y pe of rcdund:rnc'y (equati(n ice) but must Ix- modified to
take into account the single I:rilure mode of the switch
Tit •
 approximate reliability is given
1 , 	I(It r -RZ ) (1-211 1 *Ill It	 l3`t)
v	 s
_^	 2 2
Yh( h(low)	 1 h'( low) - 1 - ithitI
- 2 Ith lt f ( 1-11 f) - it 	 ( 1-itf)`
where
R h It f2 - probability that the converter
and both amplifiers are good.
('file ou'put of the converter
is corre A. )
21i h R f ( 1-11 f) - probability that the converter
is good, one amplifier is good,
and one has failed low. ( The
output of the converter is
correct.)
Figure 1 I. Typical LVDA Duplex
power Supply
where it is the reliability of a channel, It
v 
is the relia-
WRY of the voter or comparat,^r. -trill It
s 
is the relia-
bility of the switch. It ha, bean estimated that for a
Saturn V mission, it 	 Ir,!rulrr;l
	 It	 0.!1999:16, and
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R s = 0, 999912 resulting in ;in overall di{,rital-to-analog
converter unreliability of U r = 89. In comparison, the
unreliability of a simplex system is U
s 
= 352. The
redundancy has consequently resulted in a decrease in
unreliability by a factor of 3. 94.
me nµ [or[vnR s^cNA<
9 fir ^pO(R •^	
_—______
—	 sr a»	 wsr
f en	 uootR	 vrRl[	 Arr[	 —
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Figure 12. LVDA Di{,rital-To-Analog :Attitude
Correction Conversion
REFERENCE CHANNEL
9 fIT REGISTER, LA00[R
Nf TrC a.. AND ONE AYR
u- SSt
{ IME AMD
COARSE COMPARATOR
	
_	 r	 u ••
JBIT REGISTER,
LADDER N('RORR,	 [l [C TRON^C ANALOG
,WITAt
	 TWO APPS AND 
	 —	 i	 SRITCM	
OUTF T
NIUT	 SAMOLE AND »DID
l	 u• 351	 u Q
9 fr RFG
	 FR,
L	
[ADO[R NrTNJRR,
Two 1YRS AND
	 _.^ F
S.AII AND »OLD
	 1
u • SSt
Figrure 13. LVDA Digital-to-Analog attitude
Correction Conversion
Because of the nature of digital systems, inter-
mittent failures are much more predominant than hard
or solid failures. Therefore, the abilit y to switch from
the standby unit back to the prime-reference system has
been incorporated in the converter and the INDC system
Since types of failures were not considered in the alraly-
sis, the reliability estimate is pessimistic from this
standpoint.
In the LVDA, the reliability aevessment has dealt
with isolated examples, mainly the power supply and the
digital-to-analog converter. Two other examples, that
of processing attitude and acceleration inputs. are
covered later. Table Ili ^;umm_:sizes the reliability of
each major subsystem of the two units, both fur the
simplex and redundant case. Also shown is ill( , ratio of
the probability of failure of a simplex unit to that of a
redundant unit. This factor indicates to some degree
tt'hat has beer gained through redundancy.
Table II1. Summary of Unreliability of Simplex and
Redundant LVDC and LVDA
F: lernent 1'nr<'l l:,bl tv	 Vnn•hubinty
U .	 tlN	 1'	 1'
LVDC
1"po, .. SiNI	 IU	 .',n
Memory ( » m In duple v	 5.9641	 226	 .Y. 4
( ,.,- O W" I 16
'I'otd IA'U<' ». 4.r;	 252	 33 f
LVVA
Pus[er Supply 71,. 141 79 2
Input Output 801) IU 411	 0
I.lgW .,4'11) 10 24:1
TOCII I V1)A 4.1122 :lu 1:14
Total e'omputer sy,4em	 12,494	 242	 44. 3
Stabilized Platform System
The stabilized platform is the basic reference for
the Saturn navigation, guidance, and control systems.
The :system proVidcs ;1 space dire[ tirnl-fi:<cd coordinate
reference frame yehieh servos as a reference for the
vehicle's attitude. The stabilized element serves as a
base for three mutually-urtho, r.onal accelerometers ',which
provide the information from which trant0ational Velocity
and position of the vehicle are derived. The stahili7ed
platform system consuls, of an inertial platform, the
associated electront' , for Internal stahilLrattnn and
processing of output information, an citctrteal pov:cr
supply. and a nitro",en gas ,;tmply.
The ST13 .1-?.l platform used in the Saturn V system
is a three-Irimbal device which allows uidimited rotation
of the \Thiele abomit the pitch and toll axes. Potation
about the vehicle yaw axis 1 referenced to l:uinch position)
is limited to f GO degrees, t•:hi,'h is adequate to accom-
plish the Apollo mission. To accommodate missions
requiring; unlimited glmhal freedom about all three 1%cs.
the c apahilit, of incorporating a fourth gimbal has hecn
designed iuto the system. On the three-iinlhal platform,
the order of the gimbals from the stabilized lahle ouhvard is
pitch, yaw, and roll, referenced to the vehicle • 1•[TSition
at liftoff. Dual-speed resolvers used a.; onto tar cn-
c(oders un the gimbal pivots provide information from
which the vehicle attihaie is derived. Three single-
dcgroe-of-freedom p) , roscopes provide the reference for
the stable table on whtc• h thr th_cc pendulous integrating
gyro accelerometers arc mounted. Signal generators on
the output axes of the reference ki , roscope• s derive elec-
trical signals pro{xrr•ttonal to distu r bance torques about
the • mutually perpendicular axes. These silmals arc
amplified and shaped in the associated electronics and
used to drive servotorque motors which maintain the
Inertial gimbal space-direction-fixed.
The inertial element of the reference gyroscope is a
synchonous hysteresis kn'ro wheel having an angular
momentum of 2. (i x In s g c111 2 , s. The V:hcel Is driven at
f^'7 -.5.5  3
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24,000 rpm from a 400liz excitation source. The gyro
wheel is mounted inside a cylinder which serves as the
journal of a gas bearing. The cylinder is suspended on
the side and ends by a film of gaseous nitrogen emanat-
ing from a series of holes in the supporting sleeve. The
signal generator, which senses the ankmiar displacement
of the output axis, and a torque generator used in initial
erection are coupled to the cylinder.
Each pendulous integrating gyro accelerometer
(three of which are mounted on the stable table) contains
a single-degree-of-freedom gyro. The gyro motor and
flywheel are shifted along the spin reference axis to
provide the desired pendulosity about the output axis.
The gyro is a synchronous hysteresis type similar in
construction to the reference gyro but smaller in size.
It has an angular momentum of 94, 000 g cm2/s at a
wheel speed of 12,000 rpm and is driven by the same
400 Hz source that drives the reference gyros. The
accelerometer gyro is also mounted in a gas floated
cylinder. The pendulous cylinder is tree to rotate
about the gyro input axis along which the acceleration is
to be measured. The pendulosity causes a torque and
therefore a precession proportional to acceleration along
the input axis. The speed at which the gyro cylinder
rotates is therefore proportional to acceleration and the
position is proportional to velocity. An optical incre-
mental encoder on the input axis is used to measure the
velocity information.
A significant portion of the platform supporting
electronics is required to close the platform gimbal
servoloops aad the accelerometer servoloops. The
servoloops use a 4. 8 kHz suppressed carrier modula-
tion system with the stgnai generator outputs being
amplified and demodulated on the gimbals of the plat-
form. The resulting do signal from the platform is
routed to a separate electronics box \%here it is shaped
by a lead-lag stabilization network, remodulated, ampli-
fied, and demodulated to drive a do power bridge which
supplies current to the appropriate torquer. Another
major function of the supporting electronics is shaping
the accelerometer optical encoder outputs. The encoder
sine and cosine waves are amplified and converted to
square waves for processing in the digital computer
system. This system as well as the gimbal readout
system, both of which interface very tightly with the dig-
ital computer system, is discussed i n more detail later.
The supporting subsystems include separate power
supplies which derive, from the vehicle 23 V do buss,
all ac and do voltages necessary to operate the platform
system. A three-phase 400 hz sine wave and three
single-phase square wave reference signals at 4.8 kitz,
1. 92 kHz, 1.6 kHz,and 56 V do are provided. Another
supporting subsystem is the gaseous nitrogen supply
utilized to float the gyro cylinders. Nitrogen is supplied
from a 0. 056 m 3 (2 ft3 ) storage reservoir pressurized
to 20.7 x 106
 N, m' (3000 psi). The gas Is regulated to
10. 3 x 10 4
 N/m= d t 15 paid) for use in the platform.
Because of the problems involved in providing
redundant stabilizing gyros and other platf ^rrn elements,
the platform does not utilize the extensive redundancy
found in some of the other guidance and control
15
subsystems. Instead of providing redundancy at the com-
ponent or module level, it is more expedient in this case
to provide a total system backup. The spacecraft is used
to back up the Saturn launch veh.zle guidance system
during the orbital and trauslunar injection phases. I[
will also provide a backup for the Saturn platform as well
as the guidance computations performed in the digital
computer system. The backup is limited to the later
phases since it is not feasible to implement the guidance
equations used to inject the vehicle into a tL'th orbit be-
cause of limitations of the spacecraft computer memory
capacity . Some consideration is being given to a second-
ary surnplificd reference system within the launch vehicle
(e. g. , a strapped-down system) to provide a backup to
the platform during all fligt.t pha; •, s. Another approach
being considered is the provlsiau for manual boostr r
control in the event of a platform system failure. In any
case, the launch vehtc • ledlF,ital s'ystcm mustcontinue be
function in all phases regardless of thc guidance sy:;tcm
backup employed since sequencing, telemetry calibration,
andothcr functions arc •
 stil' performed by tte launch
vehicle digital computer.
In addition to the total system backup, redundancy is
incorporated in certain critical port[„ns of the taa!form
where it can 1,, readily applied. Primary examples of
this are as follows:
1. The multispeed analog resolvers on the gimua ►
pivots, which are used V. measure the vehicle angular
orientation with respect to the platform.
2. Two channels of information are provided from
each optical incremental encoder on the accelerometer.
both the optisyns and signal conditioning circuitry are
duplexed. The two channels have Vtival resolution and
provide a redundant channel of infonnation into the data
adapter.
3. Duplex redundancy is applied in portions of the
circuitry of the power supply package used for excitation
of the stabi l izing and accelerometer gyros.
Since items 1 and 2 involve very_ close interfaces
with the digital computer system, a detailed functional
description of this portion of the guidance and control
system, which includes some pla tform and some digital
systern elements, is covered here. The accompanying
demonstration of reliability improvement through th- use
of redundancy is also covered on a functional basis ra,her
than as individual elements in separate subsystems. In
the overall subsystem reliability assessments, however,
the reliability of the individual elements are included in
their respective subsystems
A block diagram of the multispeed resolver channels,
including those portions of the digital computer system
data adapter used to process the information and pro^.:de
vehicle attitude correction commands, is shown in Fig-
ure 11.
The three resolv ers, one for each coordinate axis,
have both a 32:1 and a 1:1 winding on the • same magnetin
structure. For the 32:1 winding, 32 electrical degrees
c, rrespond to one mechanical degree. The outputs of the
N,
3resolvers are fed through successive platform gimbals
by means of sliprings. The resolver excitation fre-
quency ( 1010 Hz) is derived from the dikiLtl computer
clock and fed to the platform. Two power supplies are
used, and the system is organized such that no :12:1 and
1:1 system in the same channel receives power from the
same supply. Therefore, the system is arranged such
that a failure is one resolver system or power supply is
backed up by the other system.
The outputs of the resolvers are fed to RC phase
shift networks in the data adapter and then to crossover
detectors (COD) which detect when each signal crosses
zero going positive. This signal is then gated to an
1 t-bit counter in the data adapter. Crossover of one of
the sinusoidal signals is used as a start pulse and gates
the 2. 049911iz computer clock to the counter. The other
sinusoidal crossover is used to stop or turn off the 2. 048
MHz counter. Therefore, tt a value obtained by the
count^r is directly proporticnal to the phase shtftbet-ween
the two signals and is representative of resI lvcr shalt
position am: vehicle attitude. Tither a single or a double
RC network is employed on the s.ngle speed resolver.
The 32:1 system employs a double RC network resulting
in an equivalent resolution of 64:1. The selection of a
single or double RC network for the single speed system
is under program control. The single network provides
a whole value; however, in case of failure of the 32:1
s ••stem, the resolution of the 1:1 system may be
doahled (2:1) by employing the additional RC network.
( For the 2:1 system to back up the 64:1 s ystem, a de-
crease in resolution by a factor of 32 must bo tolerated. )
,^,^; n wr• wsa•rn	 1	 ^  m awn	 t  .. ^	 ^
0
rr
M•ro•r	 ^
Figure 14. LVDA Gimbal Angle Processing
System
The multiplexers in the data adapter are duplexed
and all resolver inputs are gated through each Ill
plexer. The resolver to be read into the duplexed
couni<rrs is selected by computer program. The output
of each counter is routed to three (TAlfll subtrac t. and
limit check circuits, which compare the counter read-
'ngs within a predetc-rmined range. The computer is
alerted if the subtract and limit test has failed. A
counter disagreement indicates either a power supply,
COD, resolver, or counte r failure. A power supply
failure results !n multiresotver error readings which
may be logs^ally assessed by the computer program.
When the sul:ract and limit test fails to determine if the
failure is due: to a counter, a pseudo-resolver signal,
which is depez:c:ent on the computer program, is used to
turn on the start and stop signal thereby setting a pre-
determined value lslAhc counte r. If a failure does not
occur in this test, it r lay be assumed that the counters
are good and that either a code or resolver error caused
the disagreement betv.cen the two values. If the error is
not corrected v.ithiu a prescribed period of tirne or with-
in a given number of iterations, the backup s ya:• m is
employed. 'f a failure occurs in the counter test, the
prope r
 counter and scrializer channel may be selected
for further use.
For a reliability analysiF, this system may be
further simplified as sho%%n in Figure 15. Indicated in
tach block are the func • ticn-, or hardv:are grouped to-
gether for this ana l ys+s. Tt.:- rcHahility analysis of the
system may be considered in three parts ( Fig. 15). The
first part uses nonconventional dal, and consists of
the resolver excitation sources, resolvers, platfn:-m slip-
rini*:-, and COD'S. Th, second porti • ,a i:^ it up of
convention:dy duplil input multipl: r:^r:., counters, and
serializes. The third pant is tho TAI It subtract and lirnit
check circuits. The relialdlity of ea-h past may h^ con-
sidered independently of the others, and the ;cliability of
the system is the pro it of the reliaF.ility of c are part.
r	 Ijl	 ^iF
.	 .	 .,---
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Figure 15. Block Diagram of Gimbal Angle
Processing , Fi,stem
For the unorthodox I lex po r t'oa to function proper-
ly, the following con,i+ttons must h^ met-
1-: 1 • F 2
 ( T i • T d
 • TO - one excitation source and three
resolvers must be good,d, or
I: t . E 2 ( T2 • T 3
 TO ) - same as above except the other set
of component q
 are considered, or
E t • E 2 1(T t +T 2 ) (T3 +T 4) IT S • Tc1J- both frequency
sa.:;ccs an,: at least
one resolver in each
axis must be
functional.
f37^070
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"'hen these conditions are treated III 	 the relia-
bility of the unorthodox duplex mart is
	
1' = R '- I it I- tilt a - 1211' + tilt') • 2 It It'	 (39)e	 t	 t	 t	 t	 e t
where R is the relr.4%Jity of one excitation source, and
e
it  is the reliability of platform sliprings, the girnhal
angle resolver, and the two COD's required for each
resolver output.
The reliability of the second and third parts, found
by applying equations 10 and 17, is
p	 211	 - ft z	 (40)
m	 nr
P	 3'211 - R' 2	 (•11)cl	 11
where It
m 
is the combined reliability of one multiplexer,
counter, and sertalizer and It
q 
is the reliability of the
subtract and limit check circuitry. Combining these
expressions yields the attitude Input sysWni reliability
given by
P	 R2(-R'+6116-1'111'+6113) f21t -It')
e	 t	 t	 t	 t	 e	 t
R
211	
- It tri - 1
	
Itc -	 (42)
L'	 1
Generic failure rates for the various components
have led to the following subsystem reliabilities for one
flight.
R = 0. 999973
e
It 	 (R resolver ) (it COD )2 - (0.999914) (u. 99999.0
( 0. 99491)2)
It	 0.999879
ni
It	 --^ I.
q
The unreliability of the system ea rl then he calculated
to be U - 1. In comparison, the reliability of -I
r
system is given by
p	 (Re ) (it t ) 3 (R III )
and is found to yield an unreliability of 1J
s	
-142.
Utilizing redundancy in the s ystern has therefore de-
creased the unreliability' of the sy'strm by
U iU = 442/!	 442.
s r
!vote that in the system just described in additional
decision technique has been lined, I. e. , the computer
logical capability . Previous discussion has Iv cn eontined
to hardware redundancy; however, with oils scheme, the
computer program and logical capabilities ascervito the
system or redundant path to Iw • used for further opera-
tion. This type of decision elemerit provides the greatest
capability and flexibility: however, complicated programs
become even more complex and the normal computational
processes art- inU-rrupted while this task Is performed.
The second 1m,rtion of the platform employing re-
dundancy, the aceelcronirier readout channels, also
inu rtac • es very closely with the digiUd subs y stem. As
wan the cast- with thi s gimbal resolver channel, these
elements are also functionally described and the tic•ncfits
of redundancy arc demonstrated as a single system A
block diagram of the s y stem used in measuring and
processing the acc • elcration information is shown in
FII'Ure Ifi. The figure shows a singlL measuring chan-
nel. Three identical channels are ernploved to measure
the vehicle acceleration along three mutually perpendle-
ular axes.
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Figure It'.. Accelerc:nreter Processing System
The acceleration sensing device is :I
 gyro unlmlanced af,riut its output :rain. A
tonluc • is produced Iq the unhalanov or pcndalosity which
is proportional to the ac • celtration to ichrch the pendulous
mass is subjech d. 'ncc precession anAlc of the gyro i5
proportiot,:d to the integral of the acceleration. An
optical incrtanental encoder provides a measure of
inertial velocity with a resolution of 0, u.i In s'`.
The encoder, which is mounted directly to the gv
head on Ilie platform, contain, lamps. mirrors. Ien,.
photocell,, and amplifiers. ITtc lamp; are excited b).
-1 ., V Ili. supply I rain the platform ,y lem. Light I rom
the lam!,.. which arc eyu:dlv spaced ar•oundtheperii,herti
of the encoder, i, rctict led from the mirrors U,roui;h
leirseti and pisses lli111I.Wh txko glass disc,. ! . '. disc • ha,
duposited on it vqually " paced opaque lines. \III r-rs arc
usc,l to rt-duce the • nuini,t r of lif;ht hulh:: rt llui red. ()nc
disc is 1IM'd \chill' the o cr, roUite. The light Input G,
each p.tir of photocells or the input silmal to tht ampli-
fier, approximates sinusoidal function- as ont tit the discs
rotates relative to th e other. The ph- • l.,cc • lls are c•on-
nectid such that maxonum swmal pickup occurs on onc•
photocell \chile the other photoccllpickupi, minimum and
vtc • c versa. 1:(fectivel y , ,are pair of th, photocells
17
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generates the positive portion of the sine wave while the
other pair produces the ne>;ativc portion of the wave.
From the amplifier in the encoder oil 	 stable clement,
the signal is fed through the three platform gimbals by
means of sliprings to the accelerometer signal condi-
u ­, r  una where the signal is further amplified and
clipped to obtain square wa%es.
Two signals (one sine 'and one cosine) for each chan-
nel are fed to the data adapter. These signals represent,
:n gray code, incremental velocity inputs. One sine
wave and one cosine wave are proe.ssed in the data
adapter logic to give four velocity increments, each in-
crement representing a change in velocity of 0 .05 m/s.
Before this is used by the computer system, it is con-
verted to a binary number. After the gray code to binary
conversion, the U. 05iu/s incremental inputs arc summed
in a recirculating register in the data adapter. The
register is 12 bits plus sign; therefore, a v e locity of
204. s ill s can be accumulated before it overflows. This
value is read inw the computer approximately o, ce per
second, and the entire value velocity of 26 bits stored in
computer memory is updated.
Figure 17 indicates the accelerometer readout
system organization from a reliabilit y standpoint. The
• '2 a t V cue and 5 V 400 Hz power required in the encoder
amplifiers and for light bull, excitation is simplex. The
„Itages to the accelerometer encoders and signals from
th platform to the I.V13t, are fed through platform slip-
rings. Each block to the immediaW right of the power
supply consists of the accelerometer encoder (made up
of lamps, photocells,an amplifier, and platform sliprings)
nmlalifiers, and signal conditioners located in the plat -
form electronics. The output of each block consists of
t%%o signals, a sitte and cosine wave, which are nece,. ;iry
to obLun the velocity increments in out- axis. (Although
magnitude can ol,viously be obtained fioin one signal,
hco signals are necessar: to determine direction. ) F:ac•h
part of the gray code to binary conversiot, is unique bt
each of these si-mals and will be lumped cvilh (ht- Klock on
it; left for reliability analysis. After c inversion to gray
code. V.co accelerations in a different axis are ,.lured lo-
getht-r in a register in a glass delay line as uuficalt-cl in
the :figure. One of three delay lines can fail without
resulting in a s%Acrn failure; hoxever, other combina-
tions of acecleromc ter or	 condition tailurus c.ua
result in a system failure. The sy stem is r:,thor
complicated to analyze; h^iw, • ver, the follov.ing general
conditions apply:
1, l%'ith a failure in either the compare and Incre-
ment logic, and. or one delay line, one of the other
accelerometer si>mals not associated kith the failed
logic or delay line can be lost without a sy:;t, • m failure;
I. e. , if in I 'iguro 17 the top channel delay lino 1s lost,
S f and Y•, arc lost. A failure in either of the '!. accelcr-
onu • tor inputs can be tolerated, but a failure In either
X^ or 1'f results in :a system failure. Similar reasoning
is appropriate for each of the ,thcr channels.
2. With all inct:ment logic and the three dclav lines
functional, onl y one accelerometer signal in c ach of the
Uu •ce axis is required.
Figure 17. Ac• celerometvi , Processing Svstcm
The reliability of that part of the system bet%%vvn the
power supplic., and the input multiplexer is given by
1'	 :SRS ( 1-it.i It2 ('2.11 1` -Il l; )
+ Ili f - 11 1 ^ + (;It (S - 1211 14 +- x11 14)	 (43)
where It. is the reliability of one channel of log,: • inclod-
ing increment Iogic and the delay line, and 1: k Is the
reliability primarily of the accelerometer encoder and
si,mal conditioning circ • uit ry allhom;th it also includes
platforrr sliprings, isolation :unplilit-rs, and gra y c•odc
to binary con v ersion logic.
The input nittltiple\ers are conventional TAIR and
from equation 17 have a reliability given by
311	 It
(44)
-2
where advantage has been taken of failures In opposite
directions. It	 is the reliability of a simplt-x multi-mp It-:,v r.
The rclfabilitt of the complete redundant s^.,Wm
then I:; given by
I , 	IRc 1 1311 2 (1-11 i ) Il l	(211	 it )
Its I - H (c + fitk - 1'.'11 1 4 + KR 1;) ]	 (45)
'tit	 Itm - m
2 ]
where It is the reliability of the 20 V anJ 5 V excitationC
. 
­
 ii -ccs and Incla;dc • s lho-c sliprings necessary to get
p. Bret' to the encoders, and all other yuantitirs are as
prcvioush •
 defined. Generic failure rates and subsystem
uutl y sa y'Wld Uu tollot:in trliallilities for thosa terms
in equation -15.
F^ -5 r-_:3
1R` = 0. 999966, It l = 0. 999998, it  = 0. 999510, and
P = 0. 999999. Evaluation of equation 45 using these
m
values yields a total system unreliability of U r = 35.
A simplex system would have a reliabilit y given by
P	 (11 R' It^11	 (46)
Using these subsystem reliabilitics results in a simplex
unreliability of U
s 
= Kill.
Comparing the unreliabilities of the redundant and
simplex systems indicates a gain factor of 43. 2 over the
simplex system.
Note that the reliability of the stable elements and
the accelerometers was not included in this analysis.
Only that part of the system used in processing acceler-
ometer information w as included. Since the acceler-
ometers are simplex, an accclerotneter failure could
result in a system failure.
The value of the computer in recognizing failures Is
further illustrated in this system. The computer system
reads both the prime aceeleratior and its backup, I. e.
Xr and X 2 , etc. , and performs a reasonableness test
before either is used in the solution of the guidance
equation. The computer subtracts the two values stored
in the delay iines tr dete rmine if the values are consis-
tent or in agreement. If they compare within reasonable
limits, either value may be used. If a difference exists,
the computer then compares each value with previous
values to determine which delta value is more reason-
able. The velocity profile of the vehicle can lie approxi-
mated with afairdegree ofac • curacy through simulations
before flight, and maximum delta velocities expected be-
tween successive readings can be determined within
reasonable limits.
The third example of redundancy within the platform
system is the ac power supply. Although a portion of the
circuitry is simplex, duplex redundancy is employed in
the oscillator and frequency divider circuitry.
transformed and filtered to provide the 3-phase 4100 Ilz.
-ine wave power which doves the platform gyros.
As indicated in Figure I,, the oscillator, frequency
divider, and cyclic register circuit, are duplicated. The
signal from each channel is fed w the failure detection
and swltehovvr circuitry. Ituth of the duplicated channels
are energized, with only one ac • tivoly controlling; the
power supply. Any failure in Lhc active oscillator circuit-
ry causing; a detectable loss of output volt:egc will result
in an automatic -,wrt• hover to the st:wdhv section.
I
Figure 1x. Platform AC Power Supply
To portrav the benefits of the redundant circuitry on
the overall power suppl y reliability, a simplified relia-
bilit), model is shown in Figure 19. The reliability of a
siug;le channel of the redundant po: tion of the syst e m i;
It o 999,415 Applying equation 9 tr the duplex redundant
oscillator section yields 1' - 0. 999999 and U rp • 1. The
equivalent unreliability of the various segments of the
power supply is indicated in Figure 19. Considering the
duplex oscillator and adding the unreliability of th- sini-
plex elements results in Ur 17 s - Urp 2 + 35ti
+11+1	 3-, 0.
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From the primary 28 V do vehicle power source, 	 I
the P 	1 supply derives the acower su 1	 rower to di ive the ICs	 -T[^gyro	 "r	 (-- n rtM,I	 Kwt" are: rtn
wheels and provides the excitation voltage for- the gimbal'" •" " •"L "s r'
synchros and resolvers. A simplified block diagram of
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the power supply is shown in Figure ly.
The power supply uses n quartz cr y stal oscillator
. a reference. Ry frequency division, ternperanrr • e-
st.ble square waves of 19.2 kHz, 41.14 k11/, 1.92 kllz,
&nd 1. 0 kHz are der ived. The buffered 1 . 0; kllz and
1.92 kHz square waves arc used as reference signals
for the platform resolvers. The •1,, l,lti output is
routed to the platform electr , nurs assembl y %%h-re
it is utilized in the platform and nc • eclerometer stabi-
lizing; circuits. The 4.8 kHz square wave is also
used as the reference for a cyclic register, which pro-
duces six push-pull 400-Hz square wave outputs in 30-
degree increment_. The out put of this circ• uitry is
OSCILLATORS 	 ale AND
•N() L!^GS	 J^Urrf RS
--u•,ee
Figure 19. Platform AC Supply
(Simplified Model)
li the total power supply including the oscillator
c as simplex, the anreliahilit y would he
1 .	 -	 I V, • ;i.-,ti
	 i 1
	 X24
'The oyernll bcncht of redundant • % in this case is the
reduction of thr unrcliahilrt^ by the following ratio.
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Us _ L24
U	 370 - 1. 42
r
The relative imp-movement is considerably below that
obtained in s• ,ne of the other subsystems because a
ant portion of the power supply circuitry could
not readily be made redundant.
To demonstrate the overall platform system reli-
abilit-, the system is assessed by indi--dual elements.
The total system consists of six major elements: an
inertial platform, a platform electronics assembly, an
accelerometer signal conditioner, an ac power supply,
a 56 V de power supply, and a nitrogen gas supply. A
block diagram indicating the interconnection of these
various elements is shown in Figure 20; the unreliability
(if these elements for the ti. d hour mission is indicated.
The numbers shown include the reliability improvements
in those various elements where redundancy is applied.
As shcw•n, the total unreltability of the system including
the redundant elements is U r 13, 5:11. If the system
vas t.ltallt : in[l,lex, the following increase in unrelia-
hility in the three segments previously disc• u.ised would
result.
Reso l ver channels:	 U	 (3 V 96)	 259
s
Accelerometer readout
channels:	 U	 (3 ^ 488) - 1.161
s
Ac power supply:
	 11
s	
= 155
—
Total increase _ 1877
Therefore, the unreliability of a totally simplex platform
system would be U
s 
= 13, 531 * 1977 15, 409. The over-
all system improvement ratio resulting from redundancy
is therefore
Us15,409
U	 13,531	
1. 14.
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Figure 20. ST124-M Platform System
Figure 21 is a schematic of the guidance system
indicating that the launch vehicle platform s ystem is
backed up by the spacecraft system. A failure of the
Saturn launch vehicle platform is sensed by the digital
system by comparing the measured gimbal angle rates
with nominally expected values. %% hen an unreasonat•.e
signal is read, the digital system operates a light on th-•
astronaut's control panct. In addition, the astronaut
has displayed information derived from various space-
craft sensors, as well as communications with ground,
from which indication of the system performance can be
derived. if a failure or degraded performance of the
launch vehicle system is Indicated, the astronaut c:in
switch the spacecraft guidance signals directly into the
launch vehicle control computer. This implementation
does not provide a total hackup for the digital system as
%veil as the platform: the liigWil system mint continue to
perform many other vehicle functions.
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Figure 21. Platform Backup System
To obtain an approximation of the benefit derived
from this backup arrangement, it is assumed that the
two guidance systoms art . equally rellatic and that the
sensing and switching; mechanisms are simple ana relia-
ble as compared to the overall s ys:tems. The unrelia-
hilih' of tl.c• Latin • h vehi • Ic platform ::\, stem can he
broken down as ( 1) throul rh earth orbit injection,
lJ = h6-15 • and (2) hal.oice of !winch vehicle mission.
ra
U rb	 }ltiti.
Applying e(ILation 9 to U
rh yields
( U rb)` ( 4886 x toY x 10' = 24
where (tT rh )2 is the unr, liabilit y of the platform systems
during the period when the launch vchi-le platform is
backed up by the spacecraft platform, i.e. , from orhital
injection to completion of the mission. With guidance
backup applied onl y during the orhital and lunar injec-
tion phases, the platform ;:% stem unreliability conse-
qucntly is
1 1 r
 - IT ra - (11rh)2 ._ .Gl • 24 - 8669
where 1 T	 is the unreliability of the launch vehicle plat-
ra
form through orbital injection .
Other backup approaches th:tt would further reduce
the unreliability hart also been mentioned previously.
The lk,^sihility exist; that platform .sy stcm backup could
be provided throughout the launch vehicle flight by a
N
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simplified strapped-down guidance system, or by relying
on the astronaut to manually control the system in the
event of failure. In the latter case, the astronaut would
monitor vehicle angular and translational indications
provided in the spacecraft to steer the vehicle into orbit
with a degraded accuracy as compared to the primary
Guidance.
If the same simplif y ing asst-motions as with the
spacecraft guidance backup system are made ( I. e.
1' ( backup) = P ( primary) , "nd P ( sensing and switching)
= 0) , the following unreliability results from equation 9.
U r ° (Urab)Z _ ( 13, 531 x 10 -6 )2 - 106 = 183
A resume of the platform system unreliability and
the benefits of the backup sch rmes are shown in Table IV,
Table IV. Platform System
U	 U	 1f tJ
r	 s	 s r
Launch vehicle system	 13, 531 15,4o8	 1. 1-1
With backup out of orbit
	
8,669 15,•108	 1.7,
With proposed total flight 	 143 15,408 44. 30
backup
which indicates that a very significant reduction in un-
reliability in the platform system can be obtained only
by providing a backup throughout the Waal flight. There-
fore, several total backup approaches are being pursued.
Control System
Foralogical functional description and practical re-
dundancy application, the control system is broken down
as attitude rate sensing, multicngine (S-IC and ',-It)
stage propelled phase control, single-engine (S-IVR)
propelled phase control, and S-IVB coast phase control.
The rate sensing system is composed of two th,res
containing the rate sensors (the rate gyro package) and
the associated electionics (th,^ control signal processor
package). The rate gyro package contains nine rate
gyros so arranged that angular rat,- -about each of the
vehicle axes (pitch, yaw, and roll) is sensed by three
separate instruments: thus three separate signals,
independently derived, are available for each axis. The
individual rate gyros arc single-degree- of-freedom
instruments containing a spin motor which oper:Uc:, at a
synchronous speed of 24, 000 rpm and has an angular
momentum of 30,000 g cm^ is. An;:ul:ar rates about
the input axis, w h ich is aligned with the vehicle pitch,
yaw, or roil axis depending on the case mounting direc-
tion, are sensed by a 400 Rz microsyn pic • koff that is
electromagnetically couplet( to the gyro gimbal. The
output of the microsyn is proportional to the vehicle :in-
guL•ar rate about the input axis. The microsyn outputs,
one from each of the three instruments in each axis, are
fed in parallel into the • control signal processor. Nine
demodulator modules, three for each axis, receive the
rate gyro error signals. Each demodulator module
amplifies the input s!gnal and provides a plus or minus
do voltaic proportional W the ac input amplitude.
The power for the rate sensing system is obtained
from three separate 24 V battery supplies over three
busses. Three :static inverters in the control signal
processor upply the 26 Vans 400 Ilz power to the rate
gyros and demodulators; likewise, three do power cir-
cuits supply the necessary 60 volts to the demodulators.
Each primary power buss with its associated inverter
and do power circuit suppl i es three gyros and assoclated
electronics; one in each of the pitch, yaw :end rail
e rate sensing utilizes the 1 111S form of redundan-
cy.	 simplified diagram of one ch:uuu 1 neglecting
power supplies is sho. y n in Figure 22. The rate signal
output:: from the primary command demodulator and the
reference demodulator are sent to a comparator, which
consists of two differential amplifiers, an amplitude
sensor, and a relay driver. It tlic dilference between
the primary and reference channels exceeds a preset
level, the comparator circuit operates relay.; which
switch the primary channel out of operation and st b-
stituty the standby ch:utncl i nto the primary command
position. Taws, if a malfunction occurs in either the
primary or reference channels, We stindby channel will
be substituted. If a malfunction occurs in the suiudby
channel with the other c • hanncls performing properly, no
switching occurs. 'llic diltercnce level, at which the
circuit switches ( 1. 65 deg/s), is determined from com-
promise considerations of hardware tolerance character-
istics and expected vehicle motions. The reference
channel serves solely as a reference and is never used W
provide the r:Uc command to the remainder of the system
The I'RS redundancy :is implemented in this subsystem
does not provide the capabilit y of switching hack during;
flight to the primary channel after the standby channel
has been substituted. Such in :arrangement causes the
subsystem to revert to an equivalent simplex system
Ater a single ,
 discrepancy, even if it is transient in
nature. A multiple switching capability such as that
utilized in the digital system would Ix- more reliable,
but would also he pore difficult to implement in an ana-
log system.
The reliability assessment of the individual blocks
shown in Figuri • 22 is
R - I Itdemod) ( it rat (tyro)	 (0. 999919) ( 0. 994453)
- 0. 998372
R	 - 0.99!(9:;1.
v
These nufnbuts :ire applicable to the total flight time,
since the rate system must function throughout flight.
AppIN ing these numbers in equation 1s for the PIS system
y ields 1' - 0.!1!19!)!0; or, expressed in terms of malfune-
lions per million flights, Ur -
 
C. The numbers shown it.
where (U rub )Z is the unreliability of the system when the	 groups.
launch vehicle platform Is totally backed by another 	 Th
svatem during all phases of launch vehicle operation.	 A
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Figure 22 express the unreliability of the individual
channels of the PRS system. For the cxduicalcnt simplex
sy stem, U	 16214.S
RATE GYRO	 DEMODULATOR	 F.-RATOR
U- 15 t 7	 U B 1	 -69
RATE GYRO 1 _ _	 DEMODULATOR	 TO CONTROL
COMPUTER
U • 1917	 U•O1	 `^Y
i
i
RATE GYRO 
	 ^DE MODULATOR
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Figure 22. Attitude Rate System
(Single Chanrel)
If the rate control system was composed of three
uncoupled control axes, the unreliability of the total
system could obviously be obtained by multiplying the
above reaundant unreliability (UPRS) by thn , c. The
thiou axes are Independent except for the internal
power supplies. If the internal power supplies cur con-
sidered, however, the treatment is not quite so straight-
forward since each of the three power supplies drives
one channel in each of the pitch, yaw, and roll axes. A
simplified block diagram of the complete three-axis
system with the power supply interconnection arrange-
ment Is shown in Figure 23. The expression applicable
to the total three-axis system shown is
R = R 3 i1R 3 -R 2 ) (1-211 )+ItJ
	
c	 v
(47)
3 ( 1-R ) It 2 RR l (1-11 ) - R ( 1-2R )
c e
	 v	 v	 v
where R
e 
= reliability of one of the three power supplies
(inverter and 60 V do supply, combined) and the other
teens are as prev iously defined. The first term in the
expression represents the probability of all outputs being
good when all three power supplies are assumed to be
good. The second terns represents the combination of
properly functioning situations which result when the
power supplies are assumed to fail singly. \% hen two or
more power supplies are lu.,t simultaneously, a failure
results in either pitch, yaw, or roll. In actuation 47,
It C, _ (R inverter ) (R dcsupply ) ' (0.999897) (0. 999915)
- 0. 999812
and it and tt
v 
are as p- -viously indicated.
Fc- the total subsystem, P = 0.999980 and
Ur = 20. If the system was simplex, U = 4972
would ahpl> .Therefore, the improvement through redun-
danc• v is U /U = 248.
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Figure 23. Attitude hate System
(Ali Channels)
The vehicle attitude rate signals derived in the sub-
system, as well as the desired vehicle attitude derived
from the stahilizecl platform and digital computer, are
utilized to direct and stabilize the vehicle. The flight
control computel processes these Input aignals and
derives in an an.dog manner the approprlate command
signals for the gimt;alcd engine actuators and auxiliary
thruster valves to torque the vehicle as required. Con-
trol torque.,, on the first two stages (S-IC and c -11) are
derived by posiiiontng the four gimbaled eng rincs on each
stage. The control torques for the upper stage (S-iVII)
are obtaine(', uy gimbaling the single main engine and
activating the six fixed-direction auxiliary engines. The
two techniques are different in basic layout and are
discussed separately.
A layout of the control system of the multiengine
stages is shown in Figure 24. There are si p inputs to
the control computer, an attitude and attitude rate for
each of the three axes. These L;tgnals are individually
scaled, filtered, and then routed to the appropriate
servoamplitiers which drive the cngi•ie actuators. The
elements of particular• interest in this chain are the
filters, or shaping networks, the servoamplifiers, and
the servoa_tuators. The characteristics of each shaping
network are those required to satisfactorily provide the
required sLibilit) margins, Lakin; into :account the vehi-
cle structural bending, propellant sinshlmt , and transfer
functions of the remainder of the guidance and control
syst• m. In this module, compensation is made for
variation lx• twecn individual vehicles and individual
missions. Extensive analysis is required to derive the
shaping networks for each particular mission. This
particular module, along with its associated i=(Hatton
amplifiers, is simplex in each of the hvo multiengine
stakes. The simplex approach was chosen 'n this case
for two reasons. First, since the mission time of each
Ar-• j
^^^-553
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multiengine stage is relatively short In duration and the
shaping networks are composed of only a few components,
the predicted reliability '..-I high even for the simplex
version. The second reason is one of engineering com-
promise to conserve weight and space. Although simple
in configuration, the networks are bulky compared to
other modules of the control electronics because of the
large size of some of the electronic components (capac-
itors and inductors) required to accomplish the neces-
sary shaping at the low control lending mode frequencies
in the range of 0. 5 to 5 Hz.
Figure 24. S-IC or S-11 Stage Control System
Each servoamplifier is composed of a magnetic
mixing amplifier, followed by transisG,r stages which
provide the necessary power gain. A number of inputs
arc in each mapmetic amplifier which is the point in the
system where the attitude and rate signals from the
appropriate axes are combined. The various input sig-
nals into the magnetic amplifier are galvanteally
Isolated from each other since each is applied to a sepa-
rate winding. The excitation siymal for the maimctic
amplifier is derived from a chopper-stabiliri'd inverter
which converts the do source to a one kliz siim:il. The
outputs of the eight servoamplifiers drive eight corre-
sponding servoactuators which pl)sition the four gimbaled
engines as required. These hydraulic servoactuators
and the associated fluid supplies make up the other major
elements in the multiengine control system. The hydrau-
lic systems of the S-IC and S-II are designed Cliff rcntly
to satisfy the individual stage. rc',luirements.
A simplified schematic of the S-IC hydraulic servo-
actuator is shown in Figure 25. The servoactuator
receives from the servoamplifier :c: electrical signal
which represents the destred engine pFOSition. The
electrical signal is applied to the servovalve torque
motor, causing a pressure differential to exist between
two orifices. This pressure differential positions a
spool which in turn regulates the flow in a manner to con-
trol the position of a second spFool. The flow regulated
by this second spool determines the actuator piston
location and, therefore, the gimbal angle of the atViolied
engine. The entire systern is essentially a three-stage
hydraulic power amplifier. In addition to providing the
necessary power amplifications and conversion, the
servoactuator must also meet certain dynamic response,
load damping, and stiffness requiremenl:i. These fea-
tures are provided by hydraulic pressure feedback and
shaping within the actuator. The servoactuator also
employs the principle of mechanical feedback, which
improves reliability by eliminating the need for actuator
position information to be electrically sensed and fed to
the control computer over long lines through multiple
interfaces. The feedback mechanism converts the
rectilinear motion of the actuator to a force which
counteracts the electromotive force of the input signal on
the first stage of the servovalve.
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Figure 25. Schematic of S-IC Servoactuatk)r
The actuator has a stall loadof 507, 000 \ ( 114, 0001b)
which is eyuivalc Of to a torque of 810,000 Nm ( GOO, 000
ft lb) as applied to the gimbaled engine. The expected
operating torque range is 540, 000 Nm and below; the
major torques W be overcome are contributed by pro-
pellant duct loads and a thrust vector which does not
pass through the center of the engine givibnl bearing. In
the presence of these and other loads, Uiv actuator can
position the engine through an angle of t 5. 2 degrees at
a tide of 5 deg/s.
The fluid supply for the S-IC servoactuator is RP-1
fuel t:Iken directly from the hErhopump which also supplies
the m.un cng ­inc. This makes an ext remely simple and
reliable onlIOard hydraulic supply since only filters and
interconnecting ducting must tx' added to the propulsion
distribution system. The individual gimbal syste ms are
independent tee. ' I se thl turbopump on each engine fur-
nishes the supply for the actuators on that engine.
The S-II survoactuator is functionalh similar to the
S-IC servoactuator although physically much smaller.
The hydraulic flow rates required tcl p,Ositon the engine
arc much lower, so only two stages of hydraulic ampll-
ficatlon are required. Mechanical feedback, pressure
feedback, and liNdraulic shaping arc also cmploved :n
this actuator. The S-11 actuator ha.; a stall load of
2(12, ooI) N (1"1. 50o Ih) . The maximum load expected
S;1
Ito occur during flight is 133, 000 N (30, 000 lb) . The
S-II (J-'L) engine is gimbaled through ..n angle of t 7,
degrees at a rate of 10 deg/s.
The S-II fluid supply is different from the S-IC in
that a closed high-pressure system is utilized. The
hydraulic power source is a pump driven by the turbo-
pump shaft on each grimbaled engine. The other major
components in the fluid supply are an accumulator, which
supplies flow to supplement the main pump during periods
of peak demands, and a low flow auxiliary pump.
To illustrate the reliability improvement afforded
by the multielement control on the first two stages, a
block diagram of one-axis control neglecting the hydrau-
lic supply is shown in Figure 26. The case illustrated is
S-IC or S-II pitch control; the shaping nemorks and
associated airplifiers are simplex. The servosmplifters
and actuators are representative of the inherent M PE
redundancy.
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Figure 26. SAC or S-II Stage Pitch Control System
If one element of the RIPE confikuration can fail
without a loss of the mission, the unreliability is
dramatically reduced compared to a system requiring
all elements to function. This capability can be designed
into a system by a certain overdesign as compared to a
nomival failure-free situation. Fur instance in the
gimbal system under discussion, an additional gimbal
angle and gimbal rate capability must be provided.
Structural and aerodynamic aspects must also be consid-
ered. During certain tunes of iltf;ht and under certain
combinati ms of adverse conditions, the SAC and S-I1
stages cannot be controlled xith a failure in one element
of the :PIPE configuration. In a precise analysis, the
probability of loss of mission in the event of a failed
channel during the various flight phases would have to be
considered. The capability of maintaining control when
a channel is lost exists during an appreciable portion of
the flight; however, the simplifying assumption is made
here that MPE redundancy exists throughout. With this
s.sumption, the reliability of the MPE portion of the
subsystem for the SAC stage can be found front
21, where
R = (It electronics ) (Ractuator ) - (0.999967) (0.999424)
= 0. 999391
resulting in  --0. 999997 and U
rp 
3. For the simplex
portion of the electronics,
R = (It
q,) (11 . ) - ( 0. 9999513) (0. 999976)
- 0. 999929
and U
sp 
= 71. Adding the simplex and redundant portions
yields U r = U sp + Urp = 71 + 3 = 74.
The probability of failure for the simplex elements
and in,iiy idual parallel elements is shoer n in FigTrt•e 26.
If all elements must function prop: rly (i.e. , if no in-
herent rednndMICY e ast;l . tl c unrcliabilih, • is fo"Ind by
addin}I, the unreliability of all el: rient!;; thus
U = 47 + 24 4 (33 + 576) _ 2507,
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The layout for th, yaw channel control is similar to
that for pitch. I !:cept for a sli}- ,ht diffcrencc in the shap-
ing network:;, th(• circ• eits for th! •	c•harinols :ire iden-
tical. As sh,mii in Figure 27, the r•-)ll r,i}m:d is r-lf:;cd
with the pitch and yaw si},mals in all eight (h:e: ;: !::. The
applicable unreliahihty eumbors are also :shown. In
addition to the numbers developed, Table \% sh .%vs the
unreliability of the complete S IC pitch, yaw, 	 rnll
control system (electronics plus artl • ators) for th+
implemented redundant system as tvc • P. as a corresponding
simplex system.
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Figure 27. SAC or S-I1 Stage Control System
(Simplified Model)
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The hydraulic fluid supply systems have not been
included in this assessment. The la yout of the S-IC and
S-II h ydraulic systems is such that Cu • fluid supply
attached k3 each engine drives the pitch and yaw actuator
of that engine. A block diagram of the overall stage
gimbal system and the unreliability of the individual
blocks is shown in Figure Z •t. If a loss of one DiPF
F^ -553
24
Note that this analysis does not specifically consider the
effect of "engine-out, 11 I. e. , the loss of propulsion of
one of the four control engines. Even though the • direct
effect on the control system which would be the loss of
control torllues derived fn,m one aetuatilr in each axis is
considered, other blt.eraettons are not treated in this
simplified analysis.
As previously mentioned, the basic layout of the S-II
control system is sunil'ir to that of the S--IC. Except
for shaping networks, the electronics fcr the S-IC and
S-II are identical, Kith the oul{ruts of the servoamplifiers
living switched at slat{tng. Figures 26, 27, :old l.h :Il,i,ly
also tAr the 5-11 static and show th.- corresponding uni-Oia-
bility numbers for the lndividwil major ulcments for troth
stakes. Similarly, equations 21 and 44 are used in the
reliability assessment. The numb, rs used in th;' ,,-If
stage assessment are It = 0. 91,195'; 0 and Ii	 ;.-a .4.
The results are shown in Table VI. The ovorall im-
provement rati,l in the S-11 A.io ,v throul t rCdu„t' I.:Cy is
U s jil t =- 46. R.
the reliability numbers into equation 48 and reconverting
results in the total subsystem assessment shown in
Table V. The o%crall improvement ratio resuiting from
	
redundancy is Us /Ur = 43.1.	 —
T-N Sf NVG•V/C•Nr 	 ----
•NI • •' r 11• r Vp NC 1
S'	 U•6 9	 S R	 U•41l
_-_—.-_	
MTllll•VIC SU//,I Nn 1
'A •--s[1vWw r,p
•ND •cr "• rn• r1O 1	 s IC	
_	 U 1419
Ic _• so 10-1 	 u• i, 	 sy__—^_--S! •1:A1t-
xN . st•vu•r/  t
	 --
•NO •1 TV•TW MV 7
L 5 Ic	 u• so9	 -	 -.50
•r-suvo•r/untN - 	 - -
•ND •C ru•r. ND 7	 S Ic -_ ___-	 , i11V
ti lo;
/ITN-Sf rvO•Y/111(N
•Nr •c ru• • o• NO I
sIC	 u•NOV —	 u••eo
•NU •c ru•ro• Nos _- ---	 s K.	 __ _-- u• y19
u•se9 sn	 u•4so	 su	 utl4i
/ITCH- ft•vG•Y / , i11f•	 ----
•Nn •CTU•TO• 40 4
^^— U• 9O9	 - • 410	 T /Nr V••VIK gIH/lr M
sl•ro•rn lot•
K u, 609 iSSS (lam	 s q __	 ,•t,.7
Figure 28. Multlengine Stage Gimbal System
Table V. S-IC Control
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channel in both pitch and yaw can occur simultaneously
without loss of control, which is consistent with the
assumptions previously made, the capability of loss of
one fluid supp!v out of the four also exists. Since the
general equations cannot be applied directly to a multi-
element system having this interconnection arrangement,
a specific equation has been derived for this multi-
element layout. \kith the assumptions stilted, the follow-
ing expression results:
P = Rs R `+ 811 ( 1-11 . ) It 'J w	 J	 J	 w
+ 411 w 3 ( I-It w ) It J s + 16#,I -it  J.)Z It J
	 t^'
s Ii 4	 (48)
J	 J	 w	 V,
where R.
J 
= individual actuator-servoamplificr reliability
as previously indicated and R
N' 
= individual hydraulic
supply reliability = 0. 998581 for the S-IC stage. Inserting
Table %7. S-Il Control
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Thu layout of the propelled phase pitch and yaw con-
trol of Ole S-IVIi is basically different iron that of the
nnllticn l ;inn sfal;es. Since only ono main propulsion
unginc is employed. the control torques are derived by
positioning a single actuator in cac}t axis. A layout of
the pitch and yaw cont rol system is shown in Figure 29;
the layout of the pitch and yaw channels is simikir.
Control alootit the toll a-Nis is naintainud by :nlxlliary
engltu's :urd is discussed later. Uic cloctronic modules
in the pitch and yaw channels are siniiar to those pre-
viously discussed, with the Identical module:, etoployed
in the first two stagus being used Khurc possible. The
shaping no-works are diffe rt-nt since they must have the
particular characteristics requlr-ud to Stabil17k' the S-I%'B
stare. The S-IVIi survoac'tu:ttor Is Fury similar to (I(,-
.sign to that previously dcsuribud for the S- II stage, id-
though a IVW ICntut•us dilfCr to ad'Ipl lt 1 IhC 1-,1t'ticulal'
stage rcquirurnunts. The S-I%'11 hydnoiliv fluid supply is
also similar in layout to that of the S-ll, but the individ-
ual conlponvnis arc of a dilh-rent dcsilm. Thu m:ljor
eomp„nl nts of the Inflight Iltdd supply syslun ary the
ellOnc pump, a noltor-drI%-cn :tti dliary pump, :In
+• 7
integrated accumulator reservoir module, and associ-
ated intercorutecting tubing.
Because the S-IVB pitch and yaw control torques are
derived from a single engine, redundancy Is employed to
the maximum extent feasible. As shown in Figure 30,
PRS redundancy is employed to derive the control signals
to the servoactuators.
The I.-eliability numbers applicable to a single PRS
channel acid the comparator electronics are
It - 0.9990 57 and R  = 0.999932. 'rile corresponding
'AW
F.,vrc 29. S-IVB Propelled Phase Pitch-Yaw System
unreliability numbers are show n in Figure 30. From
equation IS, P =0. 99!1999 and 1; t' 
• 1. The reliability
numbers for the , implex portions of the system are
Ractuator ,< 0. 998 .
037 and It supply 0. 993563, The
equivalent unreliability numbers for these elements of the
system are also shown in Figure 30, A single hydraulic
fladd supply drives both the pitch and yaw actuators.
Figure 31, a simplified block diagram of the total system,
shows the unreliability associated with the varlons por-
tions of the system:, including the Pita redundant elec-
tronics. The resulting composite nunihers are shown in
Table VII.
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Figure 30. S-IVB Propelled Phase Pitch System
(Simplified Model)
I	 I	 I
I
	
I
I	 ►ITCN	 I	 ►I TCN	 II	 [l [C TRONICS	 I	 ACIWIOR	 '_==
I	 uSI	 I	 ^	 U•i161	 II
.1D. A". i'. SJPRT
IYAIN P,.YP, A— I
I
I	 ,..
I	 [L[CTRON^CS
ue
IiImo---- ►NS --
JUAN, v„YP. 	
''II
AC1.w%TOR Ln*L
I----	 1
u.e^TT_-^	
I
I	 ^^I	 TAf	
_ JJII	 ACTUAf O11	 I
I	 u..6T
	
I
I	 I
„ 1^_ ------ SIYPL[•	 --^
I
Figure ,I1. S-IVF3 Propelled Phase Pitch and Taw
GiTllh:al S .% Ste Ill I.acclnt
,rable VFI. S-IVB Propelled Phase
1! n 	1' R	 I;r	 PA	 IIN q TN
Pitch, nrglre t!ng fluid Nulryd)
	 - 1	 156:1	 11w,I	 --- 1 JtIN	 1. 22
Yaw, neglu, ting fluid wupply	 - I	 1 .r,9	 15c:A	 19u6
	 L 22
Ilydr:mllr uygdy	 n	 I:t.17 i	 -	 4197	 -
T, t.11 yr+b°n	 , 'L. I	 •c165_ I	 11 1 .7a . 1 	 1.u7_-
Thus, for the total system, the unreliability has been
decreased by the following; factor through redundancy:
iii '2T)
s' r	 9.56;)
The numbers reveal a relatively small gain obtained
by t iv redundancy :applied in this subsystem; however,
redundmicN, was applied on l ' to the electronic • . , which is
alrcadl , the most reliable porti-ii of the suh;: ystem. This
(]( , sign is the result of engineering; compromise. MRS
redundancy was easily applied in the electronics; sicnif-
i-I'lt portions alrealh e,r,lell in the control computer
because of the III Litt ienginc st;igc requirements. tin the
other hand, the servoactuator and III,- hydraulic supjlly
were not made redundant because of cornp!cxity of
implement:ition and the resulting; w'oig ,ht penalh:.
This subsystem has ;t high unreliab i lity b: cause of
tilt' major simplex lidos and III,- port ihi r t of introduc-
ing; nutro redun,lanc}' is 1) •Ing; pur, tied. A certain redun-
dancy not considered in t ilt-.:anatc::i;• g ist:: in the fluid
supply tweause the sy!:tvni has h'.o pump:-. Although the
auxiliary pump has a much loner flow than ih;main
pump, it Inig;ht sust:tin the svi tem under certain main
pump failure conditions. Th,' audit i on of a rccond higher
flan pump is being; considerc.l.
Also being, considered is the use of a modified
actuator design, ehich incorporates a "majority-voting”
sera - OValve Mid essentially consists of a triplication of
the valve and mechanical feedback mechanism in the
sercoactuaGtr. In case of a malfunction in one channel,
the two c'orrcctiy operating channels overpower the third
and the scstcm continues to function properly. A con-
siderable imp ,•ovement could be expected in the cake
I "1"---0 53
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and feedback portions of the actuator; both contribute
sigRiiflcantlV t) the actuator unreliability.
As previously mentioned, cont rol about the S-IVB
roll axis during propelled flight and about all axes during;
the coast phase is maintained by torques derived from
the on-off operation of six auxiliary thrusters. A layout
of the auxiliary control system Is shown in Figure 32.
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Figure 32. S-IV13 Auxiliary Control System
The six inputs to the system (attitude and attitude rates)
are derived in the same manner as during propelled
phase control. The outputs of the electronic system
actuate relays which operate the valves of the six auxil-
iary thrusters. As indicated, pitch is controlled by
engines A and A; yaw and roll signals arc intermixed and
determine the operation of engines C, 1), 1 •:, and F to
maintain control about these two axes. In addition to
scaling amplifiers similar to those employed in other
flight phases U) estab'ish the correct relative g;:ains in the
system, Vie electronics also include attitude sigmai
limiters. spatial switching, amplifiers which operate the
propellant valve relays, and spatial comparators. The
attitude and attitude rate signals are summed in a mag-
netic amplifier stage similar to that employed in the
propelled phases. The switching function is accomplish-
er' in a Schmitt trigger circuit which furnishes the input
to the relay driver i. The relay drivers opera G • double-
pole double-throw relays which switch power to the coils
of the fuel and oxidizer valves of the thrusters. Pseudo-
rate modulation circuitry, which provides a refinement
of the simple on-off spatial attitude control techniques,
Is also included in the spatial amplifier r+rodule. The
pseudo-rate circuitry provides a modulated hand in which
the duration and frequency of thru-.tc • r pulses arc varied
depending on the input signals. \\ 'hen the input signal
exceeds a certain level, the thrusters arc commanded to
the• on position continuously; helow a certain level, the
thrusters are turned off and the vehicle attitude coasts
within the prescribed deadband. The pseudo-raate mod-
lated band provides a more rapid damping-out of dis-
turbances and hence a more efficient utilization of
thruster propellants. The elect ronics also contain a
circuit which insures that when a thruster is activated it
stays on for a certain minimum time. This ch:ara[ ler-
istic 1s necessary to maintain the Urruslcr specific
impulse at the desired level.
The auxiliary control system employs two types of
redundancy: ( 1) PRS re[lundancy similar to that previ-
ously described is employed in the electronics portion
of the system, and 12) Cho propellant valves of the
thrusters :are conreck • d in a quadruplcx arrangement
and are activated by parallel relays.
A simplified diagram of one :axis of the auxiliary
control system I., sho^cn in Figure :;:I. The plR , h axis
coast control rcprc,cnt, the ,inildest layout. (toll and
yaw coast control are similar to pitch %%ith the exception
that they arc • coupled and require four thrusters. 'rhe
propelled phase roll control layout is similar 111 that of
Figure 33 exacta thst four thruster, are involved, with
two being simultaceously activated for cac • h roll correc-
tion.
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Figure :13. S-IVII Pitch Coast Control System
The re • licahilit y numbers applicable tat the PRS elec-
tronics modulus are It 0. 999622 and It 	 1). 999898.
v
From equation 14, 1'
	 0.999999 and ITr.(eleet) !^ 1.
The numbers used for a single module of the quadru-
	
plex salving arrangement are It 	 (It
relay) (R valves )
( 0. 4944401 1 0. 997330) - 0. 947340. Since the relay
reliability is very hir;h compared to the valves, the
simplifying assumption is made th :at the relay can be
included %%l1h the calves in this analysis. t?sing the
numbers in equation 20 for a quadruple\ arrangement
yields R	 0. ;r.r44st;, U
r(valves)	 14. The total un-
reliability of the redund,ut portion is U 	 U
rI^	 r(elccU
2 U	 = 1 ♦ 2( 14) 29. The term 2 U
r( valves)	 r(valves)
arises from the two sets of gnadruplex valves. Except
for the valves, the APS enone is simplex. The applicable
reliability numtrer is It - 11, 999905. Since thko simplex
engines :arc employed, the unreliability of this portion is
11
sp	
2 (95)	 19 1 1. The corresponding unreliability
numbers for the individual electronic modules, valves,
and cng;ines are indicated in Figure :13. The unreliability
of the pitch system as indicated is U - U + U
r	 rp	 Sp
29 - 1411 - 211.).
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The corresponding numbers for the yaw and roll
channels can be simtlarly derived. These results along
with those fur the total system, an equivalent simplex
system, and the improvement ratio art , shown in Table
VIII. The total system improvement ratio is
lijL' =27.sr
Table VIII. S-IVI3 Auxiliary Attitude Control
^Illh	 --
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29 1919
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5!I04	 11
Yaw and im,ll 54 9HO I	 498 11, Min	 a	 lI.7
^^I Tool e.a4• m	 ------	 - H7 L 570 I	 657 17.731	 27.0	 I
Note that the preceding assessment does not include the
simplex MPS propellant supply modules, which also
supply the propellant for the 5-1111 ullage engines.
The unreliability assessment for the various sub-
systcnu5 and the total control system is summarized in
Table LX. As previously indicated, the improvement
ratio is very large in the case of the rate system which is
totally redundant; however, it is not very afgnilic • ant in
the S-IVI3 propelled phase gimbal system because of the
simplex hydraulic system. Pr{marily because of the
relatively high unreliabWty of the latter, the impro y e-
ment ratio of the total control s y stem thrwil4h redundancy
is onl y a modest 5.3.
Table I\. Control System
I! V
rp ap	 r s r
Pitch, yaw, and null atlibu6 • ra4 20 0	 20 4972 241
w •na1ng aubayate ,
I
1: pitch, yaw, and roll .0 toy ab• m :f7 211	 250 10,760 49. 1
R-II pIwh. yaw, and roll aubayalen, 61 222	 243 13,254 46.9
2 9563 i	 9565 10,249 1.075-IVR pitch and yam j, 	 {Vc1!ed ph..nc l
sub.y.k•m
ti-IVA au><Illary q allude control (	 H7 570	 657 17.724 2'1
aub,yatem I
Total control system 	 12117 1n • ;GV 1 In, 775 I	 rA, 97) L_ 3 I
Problem s Associated With Redundant Applications
The benefits to be derived from redundancy have
been demonstrated, and it has been shown that the un-
reliability of it simplex system can, in some cases, be
reduced by orders of magnitude when redundancy is
applied. Although the disadvantages of redundancy are
not readily assessed quantitatively, it is recognized that
this gain in reliability is at the expense of other design
factors or operational procedures. Some of the problems
encountered with the application of redundancy arc
enumerated and t`tc effect of redundancy oil 	 system is
indicated.
The most significant disadvantage of redundancv is
the increased complexity, both in terms of componcnt
parts and system organization. in the simplest forms,
i.e. , series or parallel components, the number of com-
ponents is twice th:lt of it simplex system. Ina duplex
modular system, the number of components is more than
doubled to provide a nivans of sensing and switching. In
the triple-modular redundant digital system, the voters
and failure isolation and detection circuits require almost
as many component pawls as a single channc 1; therefore,
a system contains hehvecn three and four tittle:' as many
parts as a simplex system. In the PNS circuitry of the
control system, the component count also ranges from
three to four times that of it simples channel, depending
on the relative complexity of the corn parator required.
In the example of the quadruldcx rcdundanc • y cited in the
auxiliary control valves, no sensing or voting was re-
quired so the system is four times as complex. The only
application of redundancy v:hich doe slot add addittor.al
components to the system i.; the ,
 1f PE gimbal system; the
complexity of this system v.ss imposed b t• othe r de,iim
considerations and the hcnefits of rcdondsney are achieved
without additional complexity The. grin in reliability
through redundancy is, in this case, a humus rather than
the primary purpose• of the en lti „ le parallel elvint•nts.
Other major problems inherent In redundant applica-
tions are failure dotoution awl isolation. F.tilures in the
redundant clement most he dctcctcd and removed before
flight. Fafiure to verif y that all channels :err operating;
can :.chrall y result in a dcg,Tadation of the s •, stem com-
cd t,1 a , ;fnipl y % sN.,
 tern. For ins,Glnc • c, consider onc•
trio of a I'Mit sy stera. If the ych + cic is launrhei with one
of the units out, the ,vst: ,m would fail if either of ih'-
other two malfunctioned. Since there lure I:N'o remaining;
units, either of X•.hich could re:;alt In a syetcm failure,
the unreliahilitt •
 of the s.':,tcm i:i nearly AYice that of the
simplex system. I ailurc:; occurrfr , during flil;ht must
be ,:,•tvctud so that ccrrcvttec :c l i , • ri cnn h: • t 4 • ,t for
future fli l •hls. llec • aur,e mnl •e eolr,porcnt part ; ;Ire em-
ployed in redundant sysC ms, the nvmh: r of conipoi,cnt
part failures can be el:pcct:'d to h^- grentcr than J!r • . c in
a simplex system by a factor of th.- ratio of the number of
omponent parts in a redundant :;, : tc , m to th^ nvmh: r of
component part^i in a Minolcx :,,vt
 t.'m.
The I.VDC, LVDA, ami control s ystem Illustrate
how the failure det: ,ctton and isolation problem is
approach^d in the Saturn I r gllid:laee and control sv:;tvm.
In the IArDC a::d L\'I)1, M..a l*rcc;nent detectors Indicate
when a failure has occurred in eith, ,• of the • :^v units, each
of which cnn:lfst:; of over 100 dct ^tors. Severa l detec-
tors are "OR'c.1” tolreth.•r and fed to a bit in a 26--hit
register, stnring failure inllcat ien:; which c • an h:• read
by the ground launch computer h. `o ,r f l i t '.1 t an,l tcleme-
tered during flig •,ht. Sixteen htti; of the register arc used
to store 1.1Pt' failure infc rriat'on whlle tho remaining
10 hits; arc ue;.l for the I Il l .%. Vcc• ause of the "OK'ing"
operation, however, it is not a lv,.ire pnerVe to pinpoint
the cause of falltucc:..
To assist in fa i lure Isolation before flight, means Gy
switch in and out vat • lous redum iant paths must he
provided. For c%omple, in checking the 1 VDA p„cccr
supp:ics, switching both the feedback amplifiers and the
conv erters Is necessary. In the T:111t logic, module as
well as channel .s,citc • hing is dc,irahlc such that a failure
can he isolatt-d to mo or three logic pages. The
2H
features have been incorporated in the computer system
and means are available for checking all alternate paths
The presence of the multiple channels within the redun-
dant system, along with the isolation capabilities incor-
porated, considerably enhances the troubleshooting
possibilities. This is a significant by-product of
redundancy, particularly in a complex system such as
the Saturn digiLd system.
Signals from the ground can be substituted during
checkout for each of the three inputs to the 1'RS systems
employed in the control system. The comparator's
ability to switch can consequently he checked for various
combinations of inputs, and the standby units can be
exercised. Means are available to switch hack from the
standby to the prime unit from ground control in case the
redundant circuit switches because of in intcrinittcnt
condition during prela • rnch checkout. In addition, the
state of the cornparatc,
	
'3 telemetered such that switch-
ing to the standby is detectable during flights hocc-
ever, the switch-back capability is not present during
flight.
The necessity for failure detection, isolation, and
removal of failed units is pethaps obv c ous; however, a
more subtle problem arises In using these sc • hentcs in an
operational prelauncl checkout system. For example, if
a failure in a redundant flight item occur s hours before
the flight, a spare may be substituted wilt, nil impact on
the countdown or launch. However, should fadiure in a
redundant item occur just seconds before the scheduled
liftoff, We removal of the failed item would r^quire a
hold c ' a scrub, possibly resulting in a costly schedule
delay. A t radeoff must be made between the effect of the
failed unit upon mission success and the cost, schedule,
and other critical considerations brought about by a hold
or scrub. It is Imperative then that redundancy consider-
ations be Included in lantnch ground rules, where practi-
cal. When applied, such considerations complicate
launch procedures; when not applied, considerable
pressure is brought to bear on engineering judgement.
To derive maximum benefit from the redundancy
employed in the Saturn vehicle system, the computer
system is utilized to the greatest extent possible because
it is the only Item within the vehicle capable of making
logical choices and decisions. The Saturn V flight
program is designed to make maximum use "f the
existing redundancies in the vehicle hardware. It is
generally accepted that a major effort in am • guidance and
control system is the preparation and checkout of the
flight program. This is particularly tr y a in space vehi-
cles where each mission is different fr,m the previous
one. Consequently, the "canned" programs cannot be
used. Adding redundant features to system hardware
complicates flight programs since backup paths or
redundant loops must be inc•orporaWd. Fxamples have
previously been cited of the value • of the cowiviler system
In determining "reasonable' values for avccicrometer
and gimbal angle readings. If It is determined that these
values are not "reasonable, '• alwi-nate modes of operation
are followed. Therefore, means must be provided in the
various program checkout facilities where failur^s can
ue induced and alternate program modes e • aur he checked
in a manner similar to that employed In hardware
checkout. A problem also exists in dcte • nnining "reason-
able" values, lw,th in terms (if which quantities should be
used as well as the limits applied W each quantity.
Other disadvantages of redundancy, which are a
direct outgrowth of increased complexity, are the
physical quantities of increased power, weight, and cost.
These quantities have not tx • en, and probably cannot be,
acc• uratcl y assessed, but estimates can bx •
 made. The
most straightforward of the above quantities to consider
is power, since it is reasonable to assume that the
power requirements of it system are directly prolx,r-
tional to tfte• numbx • r of component parts; I. c. , the ratio
of the power required by a redundant sy terr y as compared
to it simplex system may be estimated U, be directly
proportional to the ratio of the number of components in
the two systems.
The weight penalty of a redundant sy stem is nit as
easy to es	 Utimate, for consideration must Ix. given ,
packaging density and efficiency, heat dissipation, and
type of pactaging technique employed. In ;[ener.cl, weight
ratio is estimated to be Tess than the c,,mp>'nu • nt part
ratio. How much lose depends on facb,rs such as type of
redundancy enrploved. failure detection and isolation
scheme,, packaging ti-chnrgaes, and type of cooling
method utilize,!.
The impact of redundancy ul,on cost is most difficult
to analvze for it run.,; the gamut of the aforementioned
problems. Cost is influenced by the nunttx • r of parts,
system design, check urt. progr:using, and launch coat:.
C ,:•t is also greati y dependent uloon the type of redun-
dancv emploved. From the initial design phase through
the launch phase, the cost of a redundant system is
probably from :I to to limes that of an equivalent simplex
system.
Conclusions
The various types of redundancy employed in the
Saturn guidance and control system and typical numlx•rs
demonstrating the I nil) r(, anent.; gained have lx•un
presented. Although the variou.; types of redundancy
show a theoretical difference in the relative improve-
ments. the choice of the type employed in each case is in
actuality d, •pendent on the practical implementation
aspects. In the dcsi;m of the Saturn guidance and control
system, the t„flowing approach was employed: Those
portions of the system to which redundancy could be
readily applied were first identifier) and then the typo of
redundancy was selected by numerical analysis and
ungi, coring tradeoff with rniphasis on the latter.
Table \ summarizes the unreHabilltics of the guid-
ance and control sv,tem, consisting of the- three major
systems.
•r
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Table X. Summary of Guidance and Control
Subsystem lleiiabilit;•
--------	
—r	 s	 s r
Stabilized platform system 	 8,6:,9 I 15,408	 1.77
Dig1 tal computer syste m	 282	 12, 494	 44. a
Contre,l syste m	 10,77 5 	 of !159	 _S. 3
I
f	
Total	 I 19,726	 n4, n65	 4 3
• C includes consider:du,ns of backup out oforhit, while I'r	 s
rotors W a Wtally simplex sysWni (no subsyst e m redundancy
and nu backup)
The :'i t;iw ' :yst• ni, which is almost totall y redundant,
h-. s significantly lower unrchability than the other hen
s , stems. This should not tx • int• rpreteLl to mean, how-
ev, -, that incorporating; redundancy in the other systems
Is to no avail. Actually, sigiificant improvement:; are
made- in all three systems lhrough redundancy. The fact
that the three major systems have sikiiificantly different
reliability and that the most reliable syst em ( in simplex
form) employs the highest degree of rcdti ,dancy enipha-
,-! •z.L , . the philosophy employed in the design of the Saturn
sv-tcrn. The approach did not attemp t to crlfo, •ce equal
reliability for subsystems of s1milar silmiflcanc •e an,l
complexity ; it was ins,ead to benefit to the m:u.imom
rc: , sonable extent in those areas where redundancy could
Le readily applied while relying on simplex elements
where redundancy would have resulted in undue complex-
ity or ather significant penalties. This philosophy
results in significant differences in the ext--nt to e.hich
rcdundan ry is applied not only within the various portions
of the guidance and control system but also throultout the
tAaal Saturn launch vehicle.
In the stabilized platform and control systems, the
unrelf'tbility remains . - h compared to the digital system
because each contains major simplex electromcchanic•al
elements. However, compared to other major systems
in the launch vehicle, where little or no redimd incy is
incorporated, the systems look very favorable. The
overall guidance and control system reliability is con-
sidered acceptable for the Apollo mission. The con-
tinuing investigations of backup schemes and design
modifications being considered are merely to enhance the
reliability further.
it should be reiterated that the unreliability numbers
shown represent the predicted number of component or
subsystem malfunctions to a m3lion flights and not the
number of mission failures. The latter. sometimes
referred to as the criticality number, is deri.ed by con-
sidering the individual failure modes and corresponding
effects. The criticalit y numbers for the various suh-
sy_,tems are considerably lower than the unreliability
numbers quoted.
Note that several subsyst e ms closely related to the
g,•uidance and control system are not included in the
analysis. Principal examples are the vehicle primary
power source, the auxiliary propulsion s y sh • m propellant
source, the swi tch selectors which provide vehicle
sequencing, and the digital command system. ^%hill•
these elements support the ,
 guidance and control r % - tern ,
then , also perform other vehicle •
 functions and u; Io,rt
other major subsv::t^ms.
The Ix • ncfits of redund:utcy must he traded off against
the resulting i ena i t!e in r;elght, powc r, c • ur,t, and opera-
tional eoniplexih;; but the application of rcdundanev e:ul-
not be utilized as a suhstitut • which permits r • l:aaati,ai
of basic reliability desiim principles. 1I11 • h reliability
component pa rts programs and t i ght duality evntrols must
he maintained; to derive practical lx nclltr_ rcdundanc•N
mu ,.-;t b •: applied to a basically hit h l y 1'c liable ay:,tcm.
The Saturn guidance and control s lv gtA , m is in
inherentl y reliable s\ • st: •m because major cmphazis has
beet placed. on de:.tlm con>:^rvatisrri and sinu,lic it•: , u:,c
of carefully select• d comlx , nent parts, and eMonsive
testing. ]n a • idiffm, through jodteh,us appli^ahon of
redundancv, the oy.•rall re:di l l is a se, • ::teni of vary h!gh
reliability :ind f	 it iliv .	 '11,­ do twnd.11 Iii1
	 t the
systern hats b, cn & r i : -:tr:d: • .i through three succc ssfui
Satire ^ 11. f1 ,hts c ilhout a lunc • tla,nal failure arri many
thousands of hours of ground testing. \l'ellrh bil, the•
result:: against the prohlem-, and dl:>ad::oiUagcs, the
c • onc• lode that the (!v.J,;n approach is justlfi, d awl has
twvn verifu •J to be b.tshal:,' sound.
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